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Abstract
My dissertation comprises three essays on the housing market. The first two chapters ana-
lyze the housing market using the hedonic model. Chapter 1 estimates a semi-nonparametric
hedonic regression that provides evidence for the change of bidding and sorting for job-access
over time in Buffalo MSA. Based on the estimation result, a decomposition of the price change
is implemented to shed light on how bidding and sorting contribute to the price change of a
house with different job access respectively.
Chapter 2 proposes an alternative approach which yields a likelihood-based estimator
for implicit price elasticity of amenity demand. An application of my approach to a cross-
sectional data set of Cleveland MSA in 2000 yields price elasticity of demand for public high
school quality and neighborhood ethnic composition. Based on the estimates of the implicit
price elasticity, it is also possible to characterize the sorting equilibrium with respect to the
amenity of interest and measure the change in willingness to pay due to a counterfactual
change in the amenity level.
Chapter 3, coauthored with Yao Wang, focuses on discriminatory steering in the housing
market. John Kain proposed the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis in 1968. He argued that the
persistent high unemployment rate among blacks in central cities might be due to the subur-
banization of jobs combined with the housing discrimination keeping blacks from relocating
accordingly. We provide the first direct test of the role played by housing discrimination
proposed by Kain’s Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis. Combining a large-scale fair housing au-
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Chapter 1







Hedonic regressions have been widely used in urban economics and public finance to study
the impact of neighborhood amenities on the property value. And beyond that, starting from
the two-step approach proposed by Rosen(1974), many studies also attempt to recover the
underlying demand for amenities from the hedonic framework. Since it is hard to find a con-
vincing instrument to address the endogeneity issue in the second-step regression suggested
by Rosen(1974), alternative approaches have been proposed.
There have been plenty of studies such as Epple et al.(2010), Heckman et al.(2010) using
an ”equilibrium sorting model” approach which attempts to identify the structural parame-
ters that characterize preference heterogeneity by exploiting the necessary conditions derived
from a sorting equilibrium model. Kuminoff et al.(2013) have a thorough survey of those
studies.
Yinger(2015b) proposes another approach to recover the amenity demand. Recognizing
that the hedonic price equation is an envelope of the bid functions for all household income-
taste classes, Yinger(2015b) derives a functional form of the hedonic regression based on a
few theoretical assumptions on the bid functions and the sorting equilibrium. The estima-
tion of that bid-function envelope leads to estimates of the structural parameters in bidding
and sorting. The theoretical framework of this paper comes from Yinger(2015b). While
Yinger(2015b) estimates the bid-function envelop using a detailed cross-sectional data set of
Cleveland MSA, this paper applies a similar framework to a repeat-sales data set of Buffalo
MSA and allows for the changes of bidding and sorting over time.
Among all various amenities, this paper focuses on only one amenity, which is the job ac-
cess. The primary goal of this paper is to provide evidence on the change of the bid function
and sorting equilibrium for job access over time. Besides, with estimates of the structural
parameters for bidding and sorting, it is also possible to separate the effects of change in the
bid function for job access and change in sorting equilibrium for job access on the market
value of a given property.
2
While there has been a consensus that the property location with respect to employ-
ment is an important determinant of the property value, various measures of job access have
been used in practice, since little has been known about how an individual perceives the
employment proximity of a property. Common measures include straight-line distance, dis-
tance along the streets, travel time to one or multiple employment centers(Witte et al.1979;
McMillen and MacDonald 1998) and some average measures such as the average distance to
multiple worksites weighted by employment(Yinger 2015) and the average employee number
weighted by some declining function of distance(Ottensmann et al. 2008). While there have
been studies (Ottensmann et al. 2008; Diaz and Yinger 2018) which attempt to find the
measure that explains most of the data we observe in real life, it is not the primary goal of
this paper. The job access measure used in this paper is defined as the inverse of the average
distance weighted by employment. With this variable definition, it is implicitly assumed
that households care about proximity to all worksites instead of just the ones the family
members work at. Intuitively, when a household chooses a location for their new home, they
might take into account the possibilities of future job switch. They might also consider the
job access perceived by other potential homebuyers who might buy their home in the future.
Instead of the fully parametric nonlinear least square econometric model estimated in
Yinger(2015b), this paper estimates a semi-nonparametric model using the sieve method
which includes the control variables nonparametrically in the nonlinear hedonic regression.
The results on large sample properties of the sieve M-estimator applied in this study have
been well developed. A handbook chapter by Chen(2007) provides a thorough survey of
those results.
This paper is also closely related to Bajari et al.(2012) who propose an econometric
model based on the efficient market hypothesis in the housing market. While the goal of
Bajari et al.(2012) is to consistently estimate the implicit price of amenities from a hedonic
regression with time-varying unobserved attributes, their model, with some modifications,
can also be used to estimate the same structural parameters for bidding and sorting as in
3
the bid-function envelope derived by Yinger(2015).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 derives the bid-function envelope following a
procedure similar to that proposed by Yinger(2015b). Section 3 introduces the repeat-sales
data set and the econometric model. Section 4 reports and discusses the main estimation
result of this paper. Section 5 checks for robustness of my estimates by re-estimating the
same model using a subsample of the data set and by applying an alternative model proposed
by Bajari et al.(2012). Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical Framework
This section derives the bid-function envelope following the procedures in Yinger(2015b).
We consider a model where heterogeneous households bid for housing at each location char-
acterized by an ordered pair (S,τ), where S is a continuous measure of an amenity and τ is
the effective property tax rate. And it is allowed that different locations are characterized
by the same ordered pair (S,τ). We assume that the budget constraint of a household is
formulated as (1), where Y is the income, Z is the consumption of a composite good whose
price is normalized to 1, H is the consumption of housing service, P is the price of housing
service, V is the property value.
Y = Z + PH + τV (1)
Since V = PH
r
, where r is the discount rate, we have (2), where τ ∗ ≡ τ
r
.
Y = Z + PH(1 + τ ∗) (2)
If we assume that all households are mobile, then all households in the same income-taste
class should achieve the same utility. Thus for a given income-taste class of households, we
can derive the housing bid function by solving the maximization problem (3), where U(.) is
4
the utility function of a household while the taste parameter α indicates that even within
one income-taste class, households may still have different utility functions. And U0 is the
utility level achieved by the given income-taste class.
Maximize P =
Y − Z
H(1 + τ ∗)
, subject to U(Z,H, S;α) = U0 (3)
By the envelope theorem, we have (4) and (5), where PS and Pτ are the partial derivative
of the value function P(.) with respect to S and τ respectively, and MBS is the marginal
benefit the household gets from the amenity at level S, which is by definition, equal to US/UZ
PS =
US/UZ
H(1 + τ ∗)
=
MBS




r(1 + τ ∗)
(5)
The solution to the differential equation (5) is (6), where P (S, τ ∗) is the after-tax price of
housing and P̂ (S) is the before-tax price of housing.
P (S, τ) =
P̂ (S)
1 + τ ∗
(6)
Differentiating (6) with respect to S yields:
PS =
P̂S
1 + τ ∗
(7)
In order to derive a closed-form bid function, we assume constant-elasticity forms for the
demand functions of S and H as shown in (8) and (9),
S = KSNSY
θSW µeεS (8)
where KS is a constant, NS is an unknown function of a set of observed factors that affect
the demand for S, W is the implicit price of the amenity, θS is the income elasticity for
5
the amenity and µS is the price elasticity for the amenity. εS indicates that there are other
unobserved factors that will also affect the demand for S. Although the functional form
of NS is irrelevant in the derivation of the bid-function envelope, we can think of it as a




θH P̂ νeεH (9)
where KH is a constant, NH is an unknown function of a set of observed factors that affect
the demand for H, θH is the income elasticity for housing and ν is the price elasticity for
housing. εH indicates that there are other unobserved factors that will also affect the demand
for H. For the ease of estimation later, ν is assumed to be -1.
Since at equilibrium, marginal benefit from the amenity should equal to the marginal
cost, by (8) we have:











φ ≡ ((KSNSeεS)1/µKHNHeεHY (θS/µ)+θH )−1 (12)
Due to the assumption of constant-elasticity, all the households have the same price and
income elasticity. Since all the factors that lead to different consumption of housing and
amenity are collected in φ, φ can be treated as a good parameter that characterizes the
household type.
From the differential Eq.(11), we can solve for the bid function for any given household
6
type φ. The closed-form solution is Eq.(13), where C is a constant of integration.






In order to derive the bid-function envelope from the bid function (13), we make the
following assumptions as in Yinger(2015b).
Assumption 1(Single-crossing property): For any two households type φ1 and φ2, if P̂S(S, φ1) >
P̂S(S, φ2) for some S, then P̂S(S, φ1) > P̂S(S, φ2) for all S.
Assumption 2: At equilibrium, the relationship between S and φ has the form in (14), where
σ1, σ2, σ3 are the parameters that characterize the sorting equilibrium.
S = (σ1 + σ2φ)
σ3 (14)
Yinger(2015a) and Yinger(2015b) provide detailed discussion on Assumption 2. One key
justification, as is pointed out by Yinger(2015b), is that Assumption 2 is ”consistent with a
wide range of assumptions about the distribution of S and φ”, most of which can be ”identi-
fied in the case of one-to-one matching”. To be specific, a sorting equilibrium with one-to-one
matching is the one where different household types choose different levels of amenity(S).
While the assumption of one-to-one matching is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condi-
tion for Assumption 2, Assumption 2 is more likely to lead to a good approximation for the
sorting equilibrium with one-to-one matching. Since this paper focuses specifically on the
job access of a property, let us consider whether the sorting equilibrium for job access is
likely to be a one-to-one matching.
The job access measure in this paper is defined in a way that different locations have
different job access. Since each location can be occupied by only one household, the sorting
equilibrium for job access with one-to-one matching is possible only if different households
fall into different income-taste classes, which is inconsistent with the reality. To address
this inconsistency, we should think of the job access measure in this paper as a proxy for
7
the true job access perceived by a homebuyer, just as all other measures do. In reality, two
properties next to each other clearly should have the same access to job from the perspective
of a homebuyer. While the inverse of weighted average distance to multiple worksites, as a
measure of job access, undoubtfully overstates the variation of job access, the total number
of different values of S should be large enough to match the total number of household types,
which makes one-to-one matching possible.
In comparison with Assumption 2, the assumption of single-crossing property is quite
standard in the literature. With the single-crossing property, any two bid-functions cross
only once. If the constant of integration C in the bid-function (13) is the same across differ-
ent φ’s, the bid functions for all household types do not cross at any point other than S=0,
in which case the bid-function envelope is trivial and economically meaningless. Therefore,
a key implication of the single-crossing property is that the constant of integration C is
a function of φ. Since (13) actually represents a single-parameter family of functions, the
envelope is jointly defined by (15) and (16).
F (S, P̂ , φ) = 0 (15)


















Since (14) is assumed to hold for each point (S, P̂ ) on the envelope, we can substitute (14)










Integrating (19) leads to:












where C0 is a constant of integration which is no longer a function of φ. In order to get rid
of φ, we can apply (14) again and rewrite C as a function of S, which yields:

























, S(λ) is the Cox-Box transformation of S, that is, S(λ) = S
λ−1
λ
if λ 6= 0 and
S(λ) = log(S) if λ = 0.












Eq.(22) is the functional form of the bid-function envelope for the amenity with measure S.
In summary, after the derivation of the bid function family, while it is impossible to
get a closed-form envelope of that curve family based on only the math definition of an
envelope(Eq.(15) and Eq.(16)), the same assumption(Eq.(14)) on the sorting outcome as
proposed by Yinger(2015) has been imposed to make the envelope derivation tractable.
Among those four parameters, µ is the implicit price elasticity, which is an important
parameter in the bid function, while σ1, σ2, σ3 approximate the sorting outcome. If we know
how those structural parameters change over time, we will be able to tell how the change of
bidding, characterized by the change of µ, and the change of sorting, characterized by the
change of σ1, σ2 and σ3, contribute to the change of the market housing price respectively.
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3. Data and Econometric Model
3.1 Estimating equation
Up to this point, only one amenity is considered in bidding and sorting. However, if we
assume that the bid function for one amenity does not depend on any other amenities, then
an additively separable structure can be imposed on the functional form of the bid-function
envelope. Moreover, since the primary goal of this paper is to find out whether the structural
parameters µ, σ1, σ2 and σ3 change over time, a time dimension needs to be added to those
parameters, which yields:












where C0 is a time-invariant constant since it is not a function of all the variables in the
demand function for S given by (8) and the bid for an amenity will change if and only if
some variable in that demand function changes.
At any time t, let us suppose for any property, a household is able to observe one
amenity of interest, measured by S, NZ other amenities, measured by Z1, Z2,..., ZNZ , NX
housing attributes, measured by X1, X2,..., XNX , and the effective property tax rate τ .
Thus any property can be characterized by a vector (S,Z,X,τ), where Z=(Z1, Z2, ...ZNZ )
and X=(X1, X2, ...XNX ) are themselves vectors. Under this basic setting, at any time t, an
additively separable bid-function envelope P̂Et (S,Z) is specified as:
























is assumed to be an unknown smooth function of Zj.
It is also worth mentioning that the theoretical framework described in Section 2 can
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be naturally extended to the case of multiple amenities, which leads to a fully parametric
model where fj(Zj) has a similar functional form as gt(Si). While a parametric specification
of fj(Zj) makes the estimation more tractable, it also imposes an additional functional form
assumption on the demand function for the amenity Zj. Thus, in order to allow for more
flexibility in the estimating equation, this paper chooses not to specify the functional form
of fj(Zj) and estimate it non-parametrically. Besides, while it provides even more flexibility
to add a time dimension to fj(Zj), which allows the functional form of fj(Zj) to be different
across time, it comes at the price of heavy computation burden. Therefore, a time-invariant
unknown functional form of fj(Zj) is assumed.
In the theoretical framework of this paper, any property characterized by (S,Z,X,τ) has
a market value V((S,Z,X,τ), and




where PE(S,Z, τ) is the highest bid for the location of the given property and H(X) is the
amount of housing service that property provides.
Then by (6), we have:




Taking logarithms on both sides of (26) yields:
log(V ) = log(P̂E(S,Z)) + log(H(X))− log(r + βτ) (27)
where β is the degree of property tax capitalization.
Suppose in a repeat-sales data set, housing attributes do not change over time, and for
a property that is transacted at time t and t’, we observe (Vit, Sit, Zit, Vit, τ
∗
it) at time t and
(Vit, Sit′ , Zit′ , Vit′ , τ
∗
it′) at time t’, then we have (28), where C̄t ≡ C̄0t − log(rt) and i is the
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index of the transaction pair where a propety is transacted at time t and time t’.
log(Vit) = C̄t + gt(Sit) +
NZ∑
j=1
fj(Zjit) + log(H(Xi))− log(1 + βτ ∗it) (28)
Replacing t by t’, at time t’, we have:
log(Vit′) = C̄t′ + gt′(Sit′) +
NZ∑
j=1
fj(Zjit′) + log(H(Xi))− log(1 + βτ ∗it′) (29)








1 + βτ ∗it′
1 + βτ ∗it
) (30)
The data set used in this paper is a repeat-sales data set from year 1999 to 2017. So
t ∈ {1999, 2000, ..., 2016} and t′ ∈ {2000, 2001, ..., 2017}. Besides, the job access measure
S is assumed to be time-invariant, i.e., Sit′ = Sit = Si. The vector Z includes three
amenities(NZ=3) as control variables, which will be explained in detail later. Therefore,


















1 + βτ ∗it′
1 + βτ ∗it
)+εi
(31)
where εi is the error term specific to the i
th pair of transactions, D1it and D
2
it′ are two dummy
variables satisfying
D1it =
 1 if the first transaction of property i happened at year t0 otherwise
D2it′ =




and among the four structural parameters µ, σ1, σ2 and σ3, given the sample size and the
computation burden for semi-nonparametric estimation and bootstrap inference, σ3 is as-
sumed to be time-invariant, while µ, σ1 and σ2 are assumed to change once every six years.










































, δ2σ1 , σ2, δ
1
σ2
, δ2σ2 , σ3 are the key parameters in this study which need to
be estimated, and I1it and I
2
it are two dummy variables satisfying
I1it =
 1 if t ≥ 20060 otherwise and I2it =
 1 if t ≥ 20120 otherwise
Thus, we have µt = µ, σ1t = σ1, σ2t = σ2 when 1999 ≤ t ≤ 2005, µt = µ+ δ1µ, σ1t = σ1 + δ1σ1 ,
σ2t = σ2 + δ
1
σ2




σ2t = σ2 + δ
1
σ2
+ δ2σ2 when 2012 ≤ t ≤ 2017
The estimating equation (31) is essentially a first-differencing version of a nonlinear model
with additively separable two-way fixed effect. While the cross-sectional fixed effect has
been cancelled out, the difference between the two summation term
∑2017
t′=2000 αt′Dit′ and∑2016
t=2000 αtDit are essentially the difference of the year fixed effect in (28) and (29), where
t=1999 is omitted in the latter summation to avoid collinearity.
3.2 Decomposition of the price change
The primary goal of this paper is to find evidence that the structural parameters in
gt(Si) change over time, which is equivalent to gt′(Si) 6= gt(Si) in the case where gt(Si) is
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an unknown function with some parameters. If we define h(Si) ≡ gt′(Si)− gt(Si), then it is














1 + βτ ∗it′
1 + βτ ∗it
) + ui (32)














1 + βτ ∗it′
1 + βτ ∗it
) + ui
(33)

















is sum of the squared residuals from the unrestricted model (33).
Since h(Si) and fj(Zjit)(j=1,2,3) are all unknown functions that need to be estimated
using the sieve method, which will be explained in detail later, the goodness-of-fit test
statistic defined in (34) is no longer subject to χ2 distribution asymptotically. A bootstrap
procedure needs to be implemented to simulate the distribution of the test statistic under
null. As long as the test statistic computed from the original sample is sufficiently large in
the simulated distribution, we should reject the null hypothesis that h(Si) = 0.
One major drawback of not imposing functional form on gt(Si) is that although we can
find some evidence suggesting that the structural parameters are different in gt′(Si) and
gt(Si), we cannot tell whether the difference is related to bidding or sorting. In other words,
one major advantage of deriving a parametric functional form for gt(Si) based on theory
is that the functional form makes it possible to decompose the change of log(P̂Et (Si)) over
time, i.e., log(P̂Et′ (Si)) − log(P̂Et (Si)), into one component related to bidding and the other
component related to sorting.
14
Based on Eq.(23), let us define





































log(P̂Et′ (Si))−log(P̂Et (Si)) = G(Si;σ′1, σ′2, σ′3, µ′)−G(Si;σ1, σ2, σ3, µ) = ∆1(Si)+∆2(Si) (35)
where
∆1(Si) ≡ G(Si;σ′1, σ′2, σ′3, µ′)−G(Si;σ1, σ2, σ3, µ′)
∆2(Si) ≡ G(Si;σ1, σ2, σ3, µ′)−G(Si;σ1, σ2, σ3, µ)
Suppose a property with an amenity level of Si is occupied by household type φi at time
t and by household type φ′i at time t’, then log(P̂
E
t′ (Si)) − log(P̂Et (Si)) is the log difference
between the bid of the household type φ′i for Si at time t’ and the bid of the household
type φi for Si at time t. ∆2(Si) is the log difference between the bids of the same household
type φi for Si at time t and time t’, while ∆1(Si) is the log difference between the bid of
two household types φi and φ
′
i for Si at time t’. We should notice that φi and φ
′
i do not
have to be different. Actually, if φi and φ
′
i are the same, that means the property i with
amenity level Si is occupied by the same household type at both time t and time t’, that is,
no sorting happens. While φi and φ
′
i are unobserved in real world, inference can be made by
looking at ∆1(Si) and ∆2(Si). Since σ1, σ2 and σ3 are assumed to characterize the sorting
outcome, unchanged σ1, σ2 and σ3 imply no change in sorting and that the household type
that occupies any given location remains the same across different time periods. Therefore,
∆2(Si) can be interpreted as a counterfactual log difference that rules out sorting and is only
related to bidding, while ∆1(Si) can be interpreted as the part of log(P̂
E
t′ (Si))− log(P̂Et (Si))
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that is due to sorting. With estimates of all the structural parameters, the decomposition
of log(P̂Et′ (Si)) − log(P̂Et (Si)) will tell us about how much bidding and sorting respectively
contribute to the price change log(P̂Et′ (Si))− log(P̂Et (Si)).
Since the sorting equilibrium characterized by σ1, σ2 and σ3 is actually a result of bidding
by heterogeneous households, to be more specific about the interpretation of ∆1(Si), a natural
question will be how it is possible to have the sorting equilibrium change with a fixed µ. In
fact, in a world of constant price elasticity, for any given household type characterized by
φi, µ is the only parameter in the bid function. Thus the bid function for each household
type will remain unchanged if µ is the same at time t and t’, which means at each given
location, the highest bid will not change at time t’ unless the household type of the highest
bidder at time t no longer exists at time t’ or a new household type that does not exist
at time t appears at time t’ and outbids all households. To put it more formally, under
the assumption that the bid function of a household type φ has the form of equation (13)
and that the distributions of S and φ are such that equation (14) holds, with fixed implicit
price elasticity µ, the sorting outcome at time t, characterized by (σ1,σ2,σ3) and the sorting




3) are different if and only if the support of the
household type distribution, i.e., the distribution of φ, is different across time.
For illustrative purpose, let us think about a simple example where Si and φi have







, σ3 = 1. At time t’, let us suppose that µ is fixed and that
there is some shock that changes φi for each household so that the distribution of φi at time
t’ becomes U [φ′L, φ
′
U ], where φL < φ
′

















will be the same as σ1 and σ2 only by chance. Specifically, for any location of property i
occupied by a household type φi ∈ [φL, φ′L] at time t, since that household type no longer
exists at time t’, a new household type φ′i ∈ [φ′L, φ′U ] will win the bid.
We should also notice that in the real world, when the household type that occupies a
given location changes, we will not necessarily observe that a new household moves to that
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location. Since the taste of an individual might change over time, it is entirely possible
that the same household switches to a new household type at time t’. In fact, when µ
changes, in order to keep φi the same, it is required that some taste variable included in
Eq.(12) that defines φ changes too since µ is on the right hand side of Eq.(12). While the
assumption of constant price elasticity rules out the possibility that the bid function of a
given household type φ changes with fixed µ, the model in this paper attributes the change
of the bid function to the change of φ. So almost nothing is lost due to the assumption of
constant price elasticity. If we observe that with the same price elasticity µ, the bid function
of one household is different from that of another, based on the definition of the household
type in this paper, the two households should belong to different household types. Actually,
the study of sorting heavily relies on the definition of a household type, which is never known
and has to be assumed. Thus, to be more precise, the result of this paper provides evidence
that household types characterized by φ in Eq.(12) sort differently into locations with various
Si in different time periods.
3.3 Data set
The first data source of this study is the New York State Department of Taxation
and Finance (NYDTF)’s Sales database, which includes information about the transaction
price, the transaction date, the address, the assessed value, the year of assessment roll, etc..
Although there are no housing attributes data in NYDTF database, a transaction will be
flagged if there is a significant change in the housing attributes. Moreover, there is also
another flag in NYDTF database indicating a reasonable possibility that the full sales price
is not equal to the fair market value of the property. Besides those flagged transactions,
a transaction is also dropped when the assessed value is more than twice as large as the
transaction price or the assessed value is zero, which is either a mistake or a sign of unfair
transaction. After dropping all those transactions, I am able to construct a repeat-sales
data set for all the remaining residential single-family properties in Buffalo MSA that have
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been transacted more than once during the time period from year 1999 to year 2017. The
final data set includes 11534 pairs of transactions. If a property has been transacted more
than twice, then more than one pair of transactions will be included in the data set. For
example, if a property has been transacted three times from 1999 to 2017, then two pairs
of transactions will be included in the data set. The first pair includes the information of
the first and the second transactions, while the second pair includes the information of the
second and the third transactions.
The variable of interest in this paper is a job access measure(S) defined as the inverse
of average distance to multiple worksites weighted by the employment. The employment
data come from the Census Bureau Zip Codes Business Patterns(ZBP) data set. For each
zip code, an average employee number is calculated based on the data from 2000 to 2016.
With the average employee number for each zip code, a worksite is defined as a set of zip
codes each with at least 6000 employees on average which are within 6 miles of the centroid,
and contain at least one zip code with an average employee number greater than 14000.
Based on that definition, five worksites are identified , on average accounting for 75.94%
of the total employee number in the whole Buffalo MSA. Table 1 presents the zip codes in
each worksite that on average contain more than 14000 employees from 2000 to 2016. Since
the geographic coordinates of each property in the data set can be obtained by geocoding
the address, the distance between a property and a worksite is defined as the straight-line
distance between the property location and the center of the worksite, which is set at a
point in the business building cluster close to the job-weighted centroid of the set of zip
codes identified as the worksite. The nearby business building clusters are found by checking
the Google Map satellite image. After calculating the distance to all the five worksites, I
compute the weighted average distance for each property, where the weight for the distance
to each worksite is the average employee number for that worksite over the 17 years from
2000 to 2016. The final job access measure in this paper is defined as the inverse of that
weighted average distance so that the job access is treated as an amenity as opposed to a
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disamenity with a positive implicit price elasticity µ, which is a bit harder to interpret. In
fact, if I do not take the inverse, according to the estimating equation (31), I will get an
estimate of −µ instead of µ. None of the other estimates will change.
One might have doubt on the assumption that the job access is a time-invariant amenity.
Indeed, if the inverse of the weighted average distance is the true job access perceived by
a household, then job access should be a time-varying amenity since the weights vary over
time. Actually, in Ottensmann et al.(2008), job access is indeed treated as a time-varying
amenity, since it is defined as the average employee number weighted by some declining
function of distance and the employmee number does change every year. However, it remains
unanswered in the literature to what extent a homebuyer responds to the annual change of
the employee number in each worksite. Intuitively, if the employee number for a worksite
decreases from 15000 to 14000, it is unlikely that a homebuyer will put less weight on that
worksite when calculating the weighted average, since it is entirely possible that next year
the employee number for that zip code will increase by 1000 or more. Even if some companies
go bankrupt or lay off workers, the business buildings are still there. If someone else wants
to start a new company, the same location will be chosen. Actually, in an MSA area like
Buffalo MSA which did not experience rapid growth in the past decade, the business area
usually remains unchanged. As we can see in Table 1, the standard deviation of the employee
number is relatively small, which means for most zip codes with more than 14000 employees
on average, the employee number does not change too much every year. That is a justification
for my assumption that the true job access perceived by the households in Buffalo MSA is
time-invariant. Since there is no way to tell how a household perceive the job access of a
property, the weighted average distance should only be treated as a proxy for the true job
access perceived by a household.
Another potential concern about the job access measure is that I use information that
is not available to the homebuyers to construct the job access measure. For example, a
homebuyer who bought a house in 2003 did not observe the employee numbers of each zip
19
code in later years, which, however, are used to compute the weight for each worksite. To
explain that seemingly contradiction, we should notice that even if the weighted average
distance defined in this paper correctly reflects how each household perceives the job access,
we still do not know the true job access perceived by the household since we do not know the
true weight a household places on each worksite, which has to be estimated. While averaging
the employment data from 2000 to 2016 is my way of estimating the weight, we can also
compute the weight based on the employment data from a period of different length or just
one year, which should lead to similar estimation results.
The last point about the job access measure is that even if the job access is treated
as a time-varying amenity, the econometric model based on (31) can still be estimated.
But different estimates on all the structural parameters should be expected. However, the
goodness-of-fit test statistic defined in equation (34) will no longer be useful with time-
varying job access measure. Moreover, in the efficient market model which will be explained
in detail in Section V, one more assumption needs to hold for the time-varying variable,
as is suggested by Bajari et al.(2012), in order to get consistent estimates. And the two-
way decomposition based on (35) can be naturally extended to the following three-way
















′)−G(Si;σ1, σ2, σ3, µ′)) + (G(Si;σ1, σ2, σ3, µ′)−G(Si;σ1, σ2, σ3, µ))
Besides the job access measure, in any transaction pair, each of the two transactions is
matched with an effective property tax rate,τ , two ethnic composition measures, Z1 and Z2,
and a school quality measure, Z3. Similar to how we should treat the job access measure
defined in this paper, since it remains unknown how people perceive the ethnic composition
in a neighborhood and the school quality of a school district, the two ethnic composition
measures and the school quality measures should also be treated as proxies that roughly
reflect people’s perception.






where t1 is the sum of all the nominal property tax rates for county, town, village(if the
property is located in a village) and special district(if the property is located outside a
village), t2 is the nominal property tax rate for the school district, A is the assessed value, V
is the transaction price and X is the STAR(School Tax Relief in New York State) exemption,
which is calculated based on the formula posted on the NYDTF website. The main data
source for the nominal property tax rate is the overlapping real property tax table from
Office of NY State Comptroller, which covers the whole period from 1999 to 2017. The two
counties that comprise Buffalo MSA, Erie and Niagara, also provide property tax rate data
but only for more recent years, which have been used for double-checking. The tax data from
Erie County start from fiscal year 2008 while the data from Niagara county start from fiscal
year 2005. One issue with the data from State Comptroller is that for the 10 jurisdictions
in Buffalo MSA that impose different homestead and non-homestead property tax rates, the
overlapping property tax rate table only provides the weighted average of the two tax rates,
which cannot be used in this study. While nine of the ten jurisdictions provide homestead
tax rate data in their tax rate tables from fiscal year 2008 for the jurisdictions in Erie county
or fiscal year 2005 for the jurisdictions in Niagara Fall county, I can only find the homestead
tax rates of recent three years for the city of Lackawanna. So I drop all the properties in the
city of Lackawanna in the data set. For the other nine jurisdictions, backward extrapolation
has been implemented for the fiscal years with no data available. Besides, the special district
tax rate for those properties located in a town but outside a village is computed by dividing
the tax levy by the total assessed value for all the properties outside a village in that town.
However, since NYDTF database does not contain information about which special district
a property is in, the computed tax rate for a property located outside a village will be higher
than the true tax rate if the property is not located in any special district either, in which
case no special district tax should be imposed on that property.
The two ethnic composition measures included in the regression are the share of non-black
population(Z1) and the share of non-hispanic population(Z2) in the census tract where the
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property is located. The two ratios for 2000 and 2010 are calculated based on the numbers
of non-hispanic white and black provided in Longitudinal Tract Database(LTDB), which
adjusts the census data for the boundary change of the census tract over time. For other
intercensal years, a polynomial interpolation has been implemented based on the 1990, 2000
and 2010 adjusted census data from LTDB.
The data used for calculation of the school quality measure are publicly available on the
website of New York State Education Department(NYSED). And the school quality measure
used in this paper is defined as a weighted average of three ratios including the share of the
8th grade students who get a score of level 3 or level 4 in the English Language Art(ELA)
test(with a weight of 0.25), the share of 8th grade students who get a score of level 3 or
level 4 in the math test(with a weight of 0.25), and the share of high school students who
get a score no less than 65 in the Regents Exam in English(with a weight of 0.5) each year.
Since I assume before a household buy a house, they look at the school reports from NYSED
website which contain the student performance in the previous year, the data needed for this
paper should trace back to as early as school year 1998. While there are no data related to
school quality in the NYSED database that cover such a long period from school year 1998
to school year 2016, I do find some test score data that trace back to as early as school year
1999. Based on those test score data, I calculate the three ratios and then average them
to get the final school quality measure used for estimation. Since I cannot find the data of
Regents Exam and the 8th grade ELA and math test score for school year 1998 from the
NYSED database, I impute the missing data for school year 1998 with the available data
from school year 1999.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the 22008 transactions that constitute 11534
transaction pairs, where V is the transaction price with dollar as the unit, S, τ , Z1, Z2,
Z3 have all been defined in the previous paragraphs. The unit of S is the inverse of 10000
meters. And τ , Z1, Z2, Z3 are either millage rates or ratios with no units.
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3.4 Estimation procedure
The estimating equation (31) is a typical semi-nonparametric model in the sense that
it assumes there exists a population criterion function Q: Θ −→ R, which is uniquely max-
imized at the true parameter θ0 ∈ Θ. Different from a standard parametric nonlinear
regression, here the true parameter θ0 ≡ (γ′0,m′0)′ contains a vector of finite-dimensional un-
known parameters γ0 ∈ Rd and a vector of infinite-dimensional unknown functions m0(.) =
(m01(.), ...m0q(.))
′. If we denote the space of m0 by M, then Θ = R
d ×M . In this paper,
γ0 = (α2000, ...α2017, β, σ1, δ
1
σ1
, δ2σ1 , σ2, δ
1
σ2





′ while m0 = (f1, f2, f3)
′. Let Fj
denote the function space of fj(j=1,2,3), then we have Θ = R
29×F1×F2×F3 in this paper.
Under the assumption of conditional mean independence, the econometric model used in
this paper falls into the category of semi-nonparametric conditional moment models defined
in Chen(2007), which is characterized by the following conditional moment condition:
E(εi|Yi) = 0 (36)
where Yi ≡ (D1i,2000, ..., D1i,2016, D2i,2000, ..., D2i,2017, τ ∗it, τ ∗it′ , Si, Z1,i,t, Z1,i,t′ , Z2,i,t, Z2,i,t′ , Z3,i,t, Z3,i,t′)
and εi is the error term in (31).
By (31), since εi is actually a function of (Vit, Vit′ , Yi), conditional moment condition (36)
can be rewritten as:
E(ρ(Vit, Vit′ , Yi, θ0)|Yi) = 0 (37)
with the corresponding population criterion function,
Q(θ) ≡ −E[ρ(Vit, Vit′ , Yi, θ)]2 (38)





















[ρ(Vit, Vit′ , Yi, θ)]
2 (39)
And a natural estimator, θ̃n, is defined as the maximizer of Q̂n(θ) on Θ, that is,
θ̃n ≡ argminθ∈ΘQ̂n(θ) (40)
which looks the same as in a parametric nonlinear regression except that the parameter
space Θ is now an infinite-dimensional space, which makes it hard to compute the maximizer
of Q̂n(θ). Thus instead of maximizing Q̂n(θ) over an infinite-dimensional space, the sieve
method suggests replacing the infinite-dimensional space Θ with a sequence of approximating
spaces Θn called sieves, which are finite-dimensional for fixed n but dense in Θ. In this
paper, a cubic spline space Fj with Kjn knots is selected as the approximating space for each
unknown function fj, that is, for j=1,2,3,
F
Kjn




3, 0], x ∈ [0, 1] : a0, a1, a2, a3, bk ∈ R}
where (x̄j1, ..., x̄
j
Kj











≤ c for some constant c > 0
For a cubic spline space, both the placement and the number of knots need to be deter-
mined based on the data. Since simultaneous determination of knots placement and knot
number is computationally expensive, a standard practice is to place the knots at the quan-
tiles and determine the number of knots based on a data-driven cross-validation procedure.
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With the introduction of Θn, the sieve M-estimator used in this paper is then defined as
θ̂n ≡ argminθ∈ΘnQ̂n(θ) (41)
where Θn = R
29 × FK1n1 × FK2n2 × FK3n3
In actual estimation, the unknown functions fj(Zijt) (j=1,2,3) in Eq.(31) are approxi-







where Kj is the number of inner knots for the cubic splines, which is selected based on
cross-validation. And the vector of knots is denoted by Z̄j ≡ (Z̄j,1, ...Z̄j,Kj) with the kth ele-
ment in Z̄j as the
100k
Kj+1
% quantile of all the observed values of Zj in the repeat-sales data set.
Bjk(Zijt) is the k
th element in vectorBj(Zijt) defined in (43), where (Zijt−Z̄j,1)3+ ≡ max{(Zijt−
Z̄j,1)
3, 0}
Bj(Zijt) ≡ (1, Zijt, Z2ijt, Z3ijt, (Zijt − Z̄j,1)3+, (Zijt − Z̄j,2)3+, ..., (Zijt − Z̄j,Kj)3+) (43)
Since most of the elements in Bj(Zijt) are functions of Zijt, considerable collinearity among
the elements in Bj(Zijt) should be expected. In order to reduce the collinearity, a cubic
B-spline basis is employed, which is essentially a rescaling of each element in Bj(Zijt).
For the three control variables Z1, Z2 and Z3, the following generalized cross-validation















where n is the total number of transaction pairs in the data set and εi is the residual calculated
after estimating Eq.(31).
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In practice, since K1, K2 and K3 are discrete integers, standard numerical methods will
not work in the minimization problem (44). So a grid search is implemented for each Kj from
1 to 10. Among the 1000 combinations of (K1, K2, K3), the optimal combination, denoted









3), instead of estimating Eq.(31), I estimate the following














1 + βτ ∗it′
1 + βτ ∗it
)+εi
(45)
The only difference between (31) and (45) is that fj(Zjit) and fj(Zjit′) in Eq.(31) are replaced
by f̂j(Zjit) and f̂j(Zjit′) respectively in Eq.(45).
Recognizing that except for 11 nonlinear parameters (β, σ1, δ
1
σ1
, δ2σ1 , σ2, δ
1
σ2





most parameters are linear, the following two-step procedure is iterated until convergence in
order to reduce the computation burden.
Step 1: Pick values for all the 11 nonlinear parameters
Step 2: Estimate all the remaining linear parameters using OLS.
According to Chen(2007), θ̂n is a consistent estimator of θ0 under the following four as-
sumptions:
i. Θ is compact under some metric d(.,.), and Q(θ) is upper semicontinuous on Θ under
d(.,.).
ii. Θk ⊆ Θk+1 ⊆ Θ for all k ≥ 1, and there exists a sequence πkθ0 ∈ Θk such that
d(θ0, πkθ0) −→ 0 as k −→∞
iii. The sieve spaces, Θk, are compact under d(.,.).




Similar to Eq.(31), Eq.(32) and Eq.(33) can also be estimated using the sieve method.














































3(i=2,3) are the optimal numbers of knots selected for the cubic splines
that approximate f1, f2, f3, and K
3
4 is the optimal number of knots selected for the cubic
spline that approximates h(Si). Based on the grid search for each Kj(j=1,2,3,4) from 1 to












4) = (7, 3, 6, 9). Based on {ûi}ni=1
and {ũi}ni=1 computed from the restricted and unrestricted model, the goodness-of-fit test
statistic F ∗=0.03848564.
In order to do the hypothesis testing, a two-point wild bootstrap procedure is imple-
mented to simulate the distribution of the goodness-of-fit statistic under the null hypothesis,
which includes the following steps.
Step 1: Denote the left-hand-side dependent variable in Eq.(32) and Eq.(33) by ∆Vi, then
for the observation of each transaction pair i, denoted by (∆Vi, Yi), construct the centered
bootstrap residual u∗i based on the the restricted residual ûi and


























Then the new bootstrap sample is constructed as {∆V ∗i , Yi}ni=1, where ∆V ∗i = ∆Vi− ûi + u∗i
Step 2: Estimate Eq.(32) and Eq.(33) using the bootstrap sample {∆V ∗i , Yi}ni=1 exactly the
same way they are estimated using the original sample.
Step 3: Repeat step 2 and step 3 for 1000 times and construct the sampling distribution of
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the test statistics.
Based on the sampling distribution of goodness-of-fit statistics, the p-value for F ∗ is
0.000. So we should reject the restricted model specification as in Eq.(32), which implies
that even if gt′(Si) and gt(Si) do not have the functional form derived theoretically in this
paper, as long as they have some functional form, the functional form should be different
across time so that gt′(Si)− gt(Si) is still a function of Si.
4.2 Estimates of the structural parameters
Table 3 presents the estimates of all the structural parameters, where ** and *** represent
statistical significance at 5% and 1% level respectively. Both the standard error compution
and the statistical inference are based on bootstrap. A two-point wild bootstrap procedure
is implemented to construct the sampling distribution of all the structural parameters, which
is similar to the one implemented in the goodness-of-fit test.
Let us denote the bootstrapped sampling distribution of a structural parameter θ by
{θ̂b}Bb=1, where B is 1000 in this paper, then the 1 − 2α bias-corrected confidence interval
for θ is defined as [θ̂λ(α), θ̂λ(1−α)], where θ̂λ(α) and θ̂λ(1−α) are respectively the λ(α)
th and
λ(1− α)th quantiles in the bootstrapped distribution {θ̂b}Bb=1 and




1{θ̂b < θ̂∗}) + Zα]
where θ̂∗ is the initial estimate which is estimated using the original data set, Zα is the α
th
quantile in the standard normal distribution and Φ is the standard normal CDF.
The bias-corrected confidence interval [θ̂λ(α), θ̂λ(1−α)] is in general preferred to a standard
percentile confidence interval defined as [θ̂α, θ̂1−α], since it adjusts for the finite-sample bias
of θ̂∗. And the p-value for all the parameters is computed by inverting the bias-corrected
confidence interval.
In Table 3, the implicit price elasticity for job access measure Si is significant with
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expected sign. Among the three structural parameters that characterize the sorting equi-
librium, the estimates of σ2 and σ3 are significant while the estimate of σ1 is not, which
provides evidence of sorting for job access. Besides, the significant estimate of δ1σ2 provides
evidence that the sorting equilibrium for job access is different before and after year 2006,
while the significant estimate of δ2σ1 suggests that the sorting equilibrium for job access is
different before and after year 2012. Moreover, the significant estimate of δ2µ shows that the
price elasticity for job access before 2012 should be different from that after year 2012.
4.3 Decomposition of the price change
Based on Eq.(35), a decomposition of the price change is implemented with the estimates
of all the structural parameters. In both Figure 1 and Figure 2, the thick curve corresponds
to log(P̂Et′ (Si)) − log(P̂Et (Si)) in Eq.(35) while the thin curve corresponds to ∆2(Si). So
the vertical distance between two curves in each figure corresponds to ∆1(Si), which tell
us how much sorting contributes to the total price change related to job access in the two
periods 2006-2011 and 2012-2017 compared to their previous periods 1999-2005 and 2006-
2011 respectively. As is shown in Figure 1, compared to the the first period(1999-2005),
the change in bidding and sorting for job access leads to a decrease in the property value
in the second period(2006-2011) and the decrease due to sorting is much smaller for those
with very poor job access. On the contrary, Figure 2 shows that, compared to the second
period(2006-2011), the change in bidding and sorting for job access leads to an increase in
the property value in the third period(2012-2017) and the increase due to sorting is much
larger for those with very poor job access.
29
5. Robustness Check
5.1 Estimation using a subsample
One major concern of this paper is that the conditional moment condition (37) might
not hold if I fail to control for all the time-varying neighborhood attributes that are corre-
lated with both the job access measure Si and the dependent variable ∆Vi. While there are
clearly far more neighborhood attributes than I include in the regression which are correlated
with both Si and ∆Vi, those attributes will not cause a problem if they are actually time-
invariant. Similar to my argument on job access, although many neighborhood attributes
have a time-varying measure, that does not mean households’ perception of those neighbor-
hood attributes are also time-varying. Let us take air quality as an example. While the air
quality index posted online change all the time. It is obvious that households’ perception of
air quality does not change as fast as those air quality indices do. In fact, if the household’s
perception of air quality is based on how far the property is from those facilities that create
air pollutants such as chemical factories, then as long as the factory is still there, the house-
hold’s perception will never change. In this case, air quality is a time-invariant neighborhood
attribute which is cancelled out in the first-differencing Eq.(31). A similar argument holds
for neighborhood safety, which is also a very important neighborhood attributes. Instead
of the crime rate of the area where a property is located, it is likely that a household cares
more about the distance to those dangerous areas. If that is the case, then the household’s
perception of neighborhood safety will not change as long as those dangerous areas remain
the same. While it is entirely possible that the dangerous place in a city changes over time
or the factory moves to another place, it is also clear that the households’ perception of
many neighborhood traits change much more slowly than the numbers and indices which are
designed to measure those neighborhood traits do. If the households’ perception of those
omitted neighborhood attributes changes so slowly during the period from year 1999 to 2017
that those neighborhood attributes can be treated as time-invariant, then the conditional
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moment condition Eq.(37) should still holds.
Since households’ perception is more likely to remain the same in a shorter period of
time, I extract a subsample from the original repeat-sales data set which only covers a 10-
year period from year 2004 to 2013. The reason I pick this 10-year period is that it still
includes the two cut-off years when the structural parameters are assumed to change. So
the same estimating equation (31) still applies, which allows me to compare the estimates
from the original data set and the subsample.
The second column in Table 5 presents the estimation results using the 10-year sub-
sample, where each parameter corresponds to two rows. The first row contains the point
estimates with *,**,*** indicating the statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively,
while the second row contains the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval for each parameter,
which is in the brackets. Compared with the estimates and confidence interval in the first
column of Table 5, which is copied from Table 3, almost all the estimates in the second




For both δ1σ1 and δ
1
σ1
, the estimates from the full sample are positive and insignificant while
the estimates from the subsample are significantly negative. The similarity of the two sets
of estimates strengthens the credibility of the conditional moment condition (37).
5.2 Efficient market model
Bajari et al.(2012) propose an efficient market model approach to address the endogene-
ity caused by the time-varying neighborhood attributes. A modified version of the efficient
market model is set up here, which replaces the linear hedonic price function and the time-
varying variables of interest in Bajari et al.(2012) by a nonlinear hedonic price function
based on Eq.(22) and a time-invariant variable of interest respectively. As we will see, the
two modifications will not affect the validity of the efficient market model, which is also
explicitly pointed out in Bajari et al.(2012).
Starting from this point, let us assume that for each property i in period t, the econo-
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metrician only observes the property value Vit and the measure of job access Si. And based
on Eq.(22) and Eq.(27), the hedonic price function for property i in period t is assumed to
have the following form:










i + ξit (46)
where ξ is a component that captures the market value of all attributes that are not observed
by the econometrician, which, as in Bajari et al.(2012), is assumed to evolve according to a
first-Markov process:
ξit′ = γtt′ξit + ηitt′ (47)
In period t’, replacing t by t’ yields:










i + ξit′ (48)













































It is obvious that by running nonlinear least square regression, the structural parameters γtt′ ,
σ1t, σ2t, σ3t, σ1t′ , σ2t′ , σ3t′ , λ2t, λ2t′ , λ3t, λ3t′ can all be consistently estimated from Eq.(49)
under the following moment condition,
E(ηitt′|It) = 0 (50)
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where It denotes all the information available to the homebuyer in period t.
Recognizing that the moment condition (50) is actually a weaker version of the efficient
housing market hypothesis, Bajari et al.(2012) approximate the Case and Shiller(1989) test
of housing market efficiency, which checks whether or not the attributes in the information
set It have any predictive power for the price change after period t. Based on a subsample of
all properties that have been transacted for three times during the sample period from year
1999 to 2017, a similar test is implemented here by regressing annualized return on average
return from the previous sales and all the observed attributes in the data set including the
weighted average distance to multiple worksites(S−1), the share of non-black population(Z1),
the share of non-hispanic population(Z2), the average of the shares of grade eight students
in the math and ELA test who get a level 3 score or above, denoted by E1 in Table 4, and
the share of high school students who get a score no less than 65 in the Regents Exam in
English, denoted by E2 in Table 4. The estimation result is presented in Table 4.
Suppose for each property i in the subsample, we observe t1, t2 and t3, which are the
years when the 1st, 2nd, 3rd transaction happened, then the dependent variable, annualized










on the year dummies corresponding to year t1 and t2
As is shown in Table 4, the coefficient estimates for most regressors are statistically
insignificant. For the two variables(E1 and τ) which statistically do have predictive power
for the annualized return, following a similar argument in Bajari et al.(2012), we should
consider whether the information in E1 and τ at time t would predict an annualized return
in the future that is large enough to affect the purchase decision for a house. In fact, for a
property with a market value of 200000 dollars, an increase of 5 percentage points in both
the share of 8th grade students who get a level 3 score or above in math and the share of 8th
grade students who get a level 3 score or above in ELA will leads to a loss of 876 dollars next
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year, which is a small amount of money compared with the market value for a house and
might not even cover the search cost for a new house. Similarly, an increase of 10 percentage
points in the effective tax rate, which is a considerable increase, will only lead to a capital
gain of 400 dollars next year, which is also not large enough to affect the purchase decision.
Therefore, based on the estimates in Table 4, it is unlikely that the information available
at any given time can predict a capital gain in the future that is large enough to affect the
purchase decision for a house, which bolsters the moment condition (50).
Based on Eq.(49), the final econometric model is the following:




















i + ηitt′ (51)
Different from t and t’ in Eq.(31), t and t’ in Eq.(51) no longer represent the transaction
year. Instead, t(t’)=1,2,3 corresponds to the three periods 1999-2005, 2006-2011, 2012-2017
respectively. Thus, if a transaction pair includes two transactions that both happened in the
same one of the three periods, that transaction pair does not contribute to the estimation
of Eq.(51) and can be deleted from the sample.
Besides, in order to obtain the estimates of the same structural parameters as in Eq.(31),
σ1t, σ2t and µt are again assumed to change every six years, while σ3t is assumed to be
time-invariant, that is, µt = µ, σ1t = σ1, σ2t = σ2 when t=1, µt = µ + δ
1




σ2t = σ2 + δ
1
σ2




µ, σ1t = σ1 + δ
1
σ1




when t=3. Therefore, the econometric model (51) altogether contains 17 parameters, which







, δ2σ1 , σ2, δ
1
σ2
, δ2σ2 , σ3.
The third column in Table 5 presents the estimates of the structural parameters that
appear in both Eq.(31) and Eq.(51). As we can see, for most parameters, the estimates
in the first column have the same sign as those in the third column. Two exceptions are





, while the estimate of from Eq.(31) is positive and
insignificant, the estimate of from Eq.(51) is also insignificant but negative. For δ2µ, the
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estimate from Eq.(31) is significantly negative at 1% level, while the estimate from Eq.(51)
is positive and significant only at 10% level.
6. Conclusion
This paper applies the bid-function envelop derived by Yinger(2015) to a repeat-sales
data set and find evidence for the change of bidding and sorting for job-access over time in
Buffalo MSA. With the estimates of the structural parameters in the bid-function envelop, a
decomposition of the price change is implemented to shed light on how bidding and sorting
contribute to the price change of a house with different job access respectively. Recognizing
that the identification assumption for the econometric model might not hold, an alternative
econometric model proposed by Bajari et al.(2012) is estimated for comparison, which is
based on a different identification assumption. The two different econometric models lead
to comparable estimates, which bolsters my findings on the change of bidding and sorting.
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Figure 1: Decomposition of Price Change from 1999-2005 to 2006-2011
Note: The vertical distance between two curves tell us how much sorting contributes to the total price
change related to job access in period 2006-2011 compared to the previous period 1999-2005.
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Figure 2: Decomposition of Price Change from 2006-2011 to 2012-2017
Note: The vertical distance between two curves tell us how much sorting contributes to the total price
change related to job access in period 2012-2017 compared to the previous period 2006-2011.
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Table 1: Zip Codes in Each Worksite that on Average Have More than 14000
Employees during 2000-2016
Worksite Zip code Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Worksite 1 14221 42416.24 1928.378 38234 44854
14150 22521 1621.447 19486 25527
14226 17520.88 1248.682 15725 19619
14228 17349.76 1217.829 14421 18926
Worksite 2 14225 26422.47 874.9868 25182 27885
Worksite 3 14202 19261.35 611.9028 18046 20121
14203 20078.41 4059.693 15406 27254
Worksite 4 14127 14200.24 1532.989 11221 15818
14224 14578 496.1599 13808 15435
Worksite 5 14094 15754.71 1777.483 13794 19152
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
V 147156.7 92836.06 2500 1420000
S .6969152 .2731579 .1823985 1.126915
τ 26.44096 7.518495 .0500969 130.2755
Z1 .9219467 .1171138 .0334291 .9991435
Z2 .9767784 .0313124 .40414 .998503
Z3 .7245556 .1463421 .1702475 .9524988
Note: V is the property value, S is the job access measure of interest, τ is the effective property tax rate, Z1
is the neighborhood population share of non-black, Z2 is the neighborhood population share of non-hispanic,
Z3 is a school quality measure. V is measure in dollars. The unit of S is the inverse of 10000 meters. And
τ , Z1, Z2, Z3 are either millage rates or ratios with no units.
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Table 3: Estimation Result
Parameter Estimate Bootstrap Std.error 95% Bias-corrected Confidence Interval
β 0.0012*** 9.649e-5 [0.0011, 0.0014]
σ1 0.2112 .0.2127 [-0.1797, 0.5695]
δ1σ1 0.0153 .0.0420 [-0.0221, 0.1543]
δ2σ1 -0.2162** 0.2307 [-0.8966, -0.0058]
σ2 1.4563*** 1.0685 [0.4310, 5.0777]
δ1σ2 -0.2369** 0.5189 [-1.8699, -0.0152]
δ2σ2 0.0893 0.5221 [-0.4792, 1.2047]
σ3 1.0287*** .0.8035 [0.1760, 2.1242]
µ -0.4145*** .0.1117 [-0.7678, -0.2807]
δ1µ -0.0211 0.0431 [-0.0832, 0.0364]
δ2µ -0.2009*** 0.3025 [-1.6971, -0.0433]
Note: Table 3 presents the estimates of all the structural parameters, where *, ** and *** represent statisti-
cal significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Both the standard error compution and the statistical
inference are based on bootstrap. A two-point wild bootstrap procedure is implemented to construct the
sampling distribution of all the structural parameters
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Table 4: Test for Housing Market Efficiency








Note: Table 4 presents the estimation result from a regression of annualized return on average return from
the previous sales and all the observed attributes in the data set including the weighted average distance to
multiple worksites(S−1), the share of non-black population(Z1), the share of non-hispanic population(Z2),
the average of the shares of grade eight students in the math and ELA test who get a level 3 score or above,
denoted by E1, and the share of high school students who get a score no less than 65 in the Regents Exam in
English, denoted by E2. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table 5: Robustness Check
Parameter Eq.(31)(Full sample) Eq.(31)(Subsample) Eq.(51)
β 0.0012*** 0.0013*** -
[0.0011, 0.0014] [0.0010, 0.0017] -
σ1 0.2112 0.7446*** 0.8254**
[-0.1797, 0.5695] [0.7249, 0.7699] [0.2362, 0.9061]
δ1σ1 0.0153 -0.0051** -0.0014
[-0.0221, 0.1543] [-0.0130, -0.0003] [-0.0780, 0.0023]
δ2σ1 -0.2162** -0.0064** -0.0035*
[-0.8966, -0.0058] [-0.0162, -0.0031] [-1.4247, 0.0003]
σ2 1.4563*** 10.9824*** 4.0630***
[0.4310, 5.0777] [3.9338, 19.3993] [0.4018, 6.7712]
δ1σ2 -0.2369** -2.2556*** -0.6956
[-1.8699, -0.0152] [-6.2382, -0.5104] [-3.4619, 1.2041]
δ2σ2 0.0893 -2.5063*** 1.7517**
[-0.4792, 1.2047] [-5.1502, -0.8526] [0.2663, 11.7368]
σ3 1.0287*** 2.6923*** 5.5928***
[0.1760, 2.1242] [2.2547, 3.3543] [0.9375, 9.8691]
µ -0.4145*** -0.1469*** -0.1979***
[-0.7678, -0.2807] [-0.1607, -0.1236] [-1.0256, -0.1718]
δ1µ -0.0211 -0.0029*** -0.0069
[-0.0832, 0.0364] [-0.0087, -0.0008] [-0.0394, 0.0418]
δ2µ -0.2009*** -0.0047*** 0.0104*
[-1.6971, -0.0433] [-0.0133, -0.0013] [-0.0018, 0.1616]
Note: Confidence interval is in the brackets. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at 10%, 5% and
1% level respectively. The first column is copied from Table 3. The second column reports the estimation
results using a subsample from year 2004 to 2013. The third column presents the estimation results from
the efficient market model.
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Chapter 2
Estimating the Implicit Price Elasticity of the Demand for Neighborhood






Starting from the seminal work of Rosen(1974), much attention has been paid to recovery
of demand for differentiated products from the hedonic framework. It has been pointed out
that Rosen’s(1974) two-step approach is problematic due to the endogeneity in the second-
step regression(Bartick 1987, Epple 1987). Since it is hard to find a convincing instrument
variable to address the endogeneity in Rosen’s(1974) approach, alternative approaches, which
do not require instrument variables, have been proposed.
Bajari and Kahn(2005) assume a log-linear utility function with heterogeneous taste
parameters as random coefficients and recover those taste parameters by inverting the first-
order condition derived from utility maximization. Bishop and Timmins(2019) assume a
linear MWTP (marginal willingness to pay) function, which implies a quadratic utility func-
tion, and recover the MWTP function using the Maximum Likelihood method. Both ap-
proaches nonparametrically estimate a general hedonic price function in the first step and
then estimate the structural parameters in the preferences based on the estimates from the
first step.
The new approach proposed in this paper is of a similar spirit in the sense that I also
perform a two-step procedure with semi-nonparametric estimation of a general hedonic price
function as the first step. In the second step, I assume a constant elasticity demand func-
tion for each amenity of interest and estimate the implicit price elasticity of the demand for
each amenity, which is a constant based on the assumption, using the Maximum Likelihood
method.
Ekeland et al.(2004) establish nonparametric identification of the hedonic model under
certain assumptions. In the context of the housing market, their result implies that the
heterogeneous preferences of households can be recovered from the hedonic price function,
the data of attributes that characterize the house and the data of household characteristics.
One key assumption used to establish identification in Ekeland et al.(2004) is the additiv-
ity restriction of the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the marginal utility and production
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function, which has been relaxed in Heckman et al.(2010). As is pointed out by Bishop and
Timmins(2019), the quadratic utility function assumed in their paper falls into the class of
identified utility function in Ekeland et al.(2004).
While my new approach will not allow us to estimate all the structural parameters in the
preferences, based on several key assumptions, I am still able to estimate the bid functions
up to a constant for each observed household, which makes it possible to measure the change
in willingness to pay due to a non-marginal change in amenity level. Recognizing the key
assumptions made in my approach will not always hold for the real data, I will discuss how
to determine whether my assumptions well approximate the true data-generating process
based on the estimation result. If we believe that the assumptions imposed in my approach
well approximate the true data-generating process in the real world and the estimation result
does not suggest the opposite, then the implicit price elasticity of demand estimated using
my new approach will be of great interest to policy-makers.
One major challenge to recovery of the demand for amenities is to model household het-
erogeneity. Based on the same assumption of constant elasticity demand, Yinger(2015b)
defines a variable called the relative slope, which captures both the observed and unob-
served household heterogeneities in the bid function. This paper follows the same step to
model household heterogeneity, as opposed to the different ways proposed by Bajari and
Kahn(2005) and Bishop and Timmins(2019). Compared to this paper, Yinger(2015b) makes
an assumption on the relationship between household type and amenity level in equilibrium
so as to derive the functional form of the hedonic price function. Estimation of such hedonic
price function directly leads to estimates of the implicit price elasticity of demand for the
amenities of interest and the structural parameters that characterize the sorting equilibrium.
While I do not make any explicit assumption on the sorting equilibrium, an alternative dis-
tributional assumption on the relative slopes of the heterogeneous bid functions is needed
to derive the likelihood-based estimator of the implicit price elasticity. The data set used
for application of my approach is the same as the one used by Yinger(2015b). Using the
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same data set, this paper demonstrates that without an explicit assumption on the sorting
equilibrium, it is still possible to get estimates of the implicit price elasticity and characterize
the sorting equilibrium with respect to the amenity of interest just as Yinger(2015b) does.
Based on the comparison above between this paper and the previous related works, my
approach proposed in this paper should not be thought of as a better one but an alternative
to those proposed by Bajari and Kahn(2005), Yinger(2015b) and Bishop and Timmins(2019)
considering our different assumptions to make estimation tractable. Depending on what as-
sumptions a researcher believes to be the best approximation to the reality, the focus of a
study and the data availability, different approaches might be suitable for different situa-
tions.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretic model. Section 3
derives the estimator from the model and then demonstrates how to implement a series of
post-estimation analysis including characterization of the sorting equilibrium with respect
to the amenity of interest, measuring the the change in willingness to pay due to a counter-
factual change in the amenity level, and testing for normal sorting. The last part of Section
3 also discusses several key assumptions imposed in my approach and points out cases where
my approach does not work well. Section 4 introduces the data set used for application of
the new estimation approach. Section 5 reports the estimation result. Section 6 reports
comparable estimates of the implicit price elasticity calculated with the procedure proposed
by Bishop and Timmins(2019). Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretic Model
Let us consider a model where heterogeneous households bid for housing service at each
location characterized by a vector (~S,τ), where ~S=(S1, S2, ..., SJ) is a vector of amenities and
τ is the effective property tax rate. Then the budget constraint of a household is formulated
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as:
Y = Z + PH + τV (1)
where Y is the income, Z is the consumption of a composite good whose price is normalized
to 1, H is the consumption of housing service, P is the price of housing service, V is the
property value.
Since V = PH
r
, where r is the discount rate(and τ ∗ ≡ τ
r
), (1) is equivalent to:
Y = Z + PH(1 + τ ∗) (2)
Under the assumption that all households are mobile, all households within the same
income-taste class should achieve the same utility level in equilibrium. Thus any given
income-taste class of households is faced with the following maximization problem:
Maximize P =
Y − Z
H(1 + τ ∗)
, subject to U(Z,H, ~S; γ) = U0 (3)
where U0 is the utility level achieved by the given income-taste class, U(.) is the utility func-
tion of a household and the taste parameter γ indicates that it is possible for the households
within the same income-taste class to have different preferences.
Let us first consider one of the amenities, Sj. Applying the envelope theorem yields:
PSj =
USj/UZ
H(1 + τ ∗)
=
MBSj




r(1 + τ ∗)
(5)
where PSj and Pτ are the partial derivative of the value function P(.) with respect to Sj and
τ respectively, and MBSj is the marginal benefit a household gets from the amenity at level
Sj, which is by definition, equal to USj/UZ .
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Solving the differential equation (5) yields:
P (~S, τ ∗) =
P̂ (~S)
1 + τ ∗
(6)
where P (~S, τ ∗) is the after-tax bid for housing and P̂ (~S) is the before-tax bid for housing.
Differentiating (6) with respect to Sj leads to:
PSj =
P̂Sj
1 + τ ∗
(7)
Following Yinger(2015b), I assume that the demand functions of Sj and H have the the
constant-elasticity form given by (8) and (9),
Sj = KjNjY
θjW µjeεSj (8)
where Kj is a constant, Nj is an unknown function of a set of observed factors that affect
the demand for Sj, W is the implicit price of the amenity, θj is the income elasticity for
the amenity and µj is the price elasticity for the amenity. εSj indicates that there are other
unobserved factors that will also affect the demand for Sj.
H = KHNHY
θH P̂ νeεH (9)
where KH is a constant, NH is an unknown function of a set of observed factors that affect
the demand for H, θH is the income elasticity for housing and ν is the price elasticity for
housing. For the sake of later estimation, ν is assumed to be -1. εH indicates that there are
other unobserved factors that will also affect the demand for H.
Since at equilibrium, marginal benefit from the amenity should equal the marginal cost,
by (8) we have:





















ψj ≡ ((KjNjeεSj )1/µjKHNHeεHY (θj/µj)+θH )−1 (13)
Solving the differential equation (12) yields the following functional form of the bid
function:







where Cj is a constant of integration, which should be a function of amenities other than Sj
in the context of the model.
The same ψj is defined by Yinger(2015b). As is pointed out by Yinger(2015b), ψj is an
index or a so-called relative slope that captures both the observed and unobserved house-
hold heterogeneities in the preferences for amenity Sj. Under the standard single-crossing
assumption in the literature, the constant of integration, Cj, in the bid function (14) should
be not only a function of the amenities other than Sj but also a function of ψj, which means
holding the amenity level of all the amenities other than Sj fixed, the shape of a bid function
for a given household is entirely determined by the corresponding ψj of that household, since
the price elasticity, µj, in (14) is assumed to be a constant. Thus following Yinger(2015b), it
is reasonable to define that any two households with the same ψj have the same preferences
for Sj and any two households belong to different household types if their preferences for at
least one amenity are different. In other words, different household types are defined to have
different ~ψ ≡ (ψ1, ψ2, ..., ψJ).
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3. Estimation
3.1 First step: Semi-nonparametric estimation of the hedonic price
function
Let us index the house and the household who occupies the house by the same i=1,2,
..., N. Following the theoretic model considered above, the location occupied by household
i is characterized by the vector (~Si,τi), where ~Si=(Si1, ...SiJ). If we also take into account
the case where the property tax is not fully capitalized into the housing price, (6) should be
rewritten as:
P (~Si, τi) =
P̂ (~Si)
1 + βτ ∗i
(15)
where β is the degree of property tax capitalization which can be estimated.
By the theory of bidding and sorting, any location is always occupied by the highest bidder
in equilibrium. Therefore, in equilibrium, the before-tax housing price is the highest before-
tax bid for housing at each location. Mathematically, for a location occupied by household
i, who is the highest bidder for that location, the highest before-tax bid for housing, as a
function of ~Si, is essentially the envelope of the bid functions with different steepness, which
is determined by ~ψ.
Let us denote the after-tax and before-tax bid function envelope by PE(.) and P̂E(.)






1 + βτ ∗i
(16)
Assuming that when household i lives in a house, their consumption of housing service












Taking logarithm on both sides of (17) yields:
lnV (~Si, ~Xi, τi) = lnP̂
E(~Si) + lnH( ~Xi)− ln(r + βτi) (18)
Applying the approximation ln(1 + x) ≈ x for small x, and replacing −β by β, we have
lnV (~Si, ~Xi, τi) = lnP̂
E(~Si) + lnH( ~Xi)− ln(r) + βτ ∗i (19)
Let us assume that lnH( ~Xi) is a linear function for ease of estimation and specify an




fj(Sij) + f̃(S̃i) + εi (20)
where fj is a nonparametrically specified smooth function for the j’th selected amenity and
S̃i includes all the remaining elements in the vector ~Si. Altogether J
∗ amenities are selected
to enter (20) nonlinearly. f̃(.) is also specified as a linear function, similar to lnH( ~Xi).
In practice, it is impossible to include a nonparametric component fj(.) in the estimating
equation for each amenity since some of the amenities do not have continuous measures in
the data. Even if all the amenities have continuous measures, it is still computationally
impossible to include too many nonparametric components in an estimating equation. Since
the theory of bidding and sorting suggests that the hedonic price function should be nonlinear
in general, higher-order terms for amenities with continuous measures can linearly enter f̃
in order not to rule out sorting.
In a cross-sectional setting, if (Vi, ~Si, ~Xi, τi) is observed for each household i and their




fj(Sij) + f̃(S̃i) + lnH( ~Xi) + βτ
∗
i + εi (21)
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where εi is the error term and the missing term, −ln(r), on the right-hand side of (19) has
been incorporated into f̃(.)
As is mentioned before, a two-step approach is proposed in this paper where the first step
is to estimate (21) and get estimates for the first-order and second-order derivative of fj(.),
denoted by f ′j(.) and f
′′
j (.) respectively, at each data point. Although the nonparametrically





fully identified at each point (~Si, τi) on the bid-function envelope.
In practice, (21) is estimated using the series method, which is essentially to approximate
the unknown smooth function, fj, using a sequence of basis functions. It has been proved that
as long as the sequence of basis functions satisfies certain conditions, a linear combination
of the basis functions can approximate any smooth function arbitrarily well in the MSE
sense(Newey, 1997; Li, 2000).
A widely-used basis function is the B-spline basis function. Let us denote the sequence
of B-spline basis functions of degree m by {Bk,m(x)}K+mk=0 , where K is the number of interior
knots. Then the sequence of B-spline basis functions of degree m with two boundary knots,
denoted by t0 and tK+1, and K interior knots, denoted by a non-decreasing sequence {tk}Kk=1,
are recursively defined as follows:
Bk,0(x) =

1 if tk ≤ x < tk+1
0 otherwise
Bk,j+1(x) = αk,j+1(x)Bk,j + (1− αk,j+1(x))Bk+1,j(x)






if tk+j 6= tk
0 otherwise
53
and {tk}K+m+1k=−m is an augmented sequence of knots such that
t−m = ... = t0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tK+1 = ... = tK+m+1
As will be explained later, the estimates on f ′j and f
′′
j are needed for the second-step estima-









′ is chosen to approximate fj.







(Sij)~γj + f̃(S̃i) + lnH( ~Xi) + βτ
∗
i + εi (22)
where ~γj = (γ1,j, γ2,j, ..., γKj+3,j)
′
It is worth noting that Bj0,3 is intentionally omitted in ~Bj to avoid perfect collinearity. For
each amenity Sj and the corresponding unknown function fj, j=1,2,...,J
∗, given the optimal




j based on the estimates
on ~γ, denoted by ~̂γj = (γ̂1,j, γ̂2,j, ..., γ̂Kj+3,j)
′. In practice, the following generalized cross-





















where N is the total number of observations in the data set and εi is the residual calculated
after estimating (22).
The asymptotic properties for the derivative estimator in the series estimation have been




j by f̂j, f̂
′
j








f̂ ′′j (Sij) =
df̂ ′j(Sij)
dSij
3.2 Second step: Maximum likelihood estimation







where the subscript i of the before-tax bid function P̂i indicates that households might have
different bid functions, which, as is pointed out in the previous section, is determined by
~ψi ≡ (ψi1, ..., ψiJ),















At a given location occupied by household i and characterized by the vector (~Si,τi), the
before-tax bid function envelope P̂E(.) is tangent to the before-tax bid function of household
i, P̂i(.), at the point ~Si. By definition of tangency, we know that the slope of the bid function







Differentiating (20) on both sides with respect to Sij, we have
∂lnP̂E(~Si)
∂Sij
= f ′j(Sij) (28)
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The closed-form solution for ln(ψij) given by (29) motivates us to estimate the model
via Maximum Likelihood. If we assume that ln(ψij) ∼ N(0, σ2j ), then applying a standard































Then based on the estimates, f̂ ′j and f̂
′′
j , from the first-step semi-nonparametric regression,
we can estimate the implicit price elasticity, µj, and the standard deviation of ψij, σj, via
Maximum Likelihood as follows:
(µ̂j, σ̂j)


















Actually, the second-step Maximum Likelihood estimation can be easily extended so that
the implicit price elasticity for multiple amenities can be simultaneously estimated. Suppose
we are interested in the implicit price elasticity for J̄ amenities(J̄ ≤ J∗), then following (29),









Replacing f ′j by its estimator, f̂
′
j, in matrix form, we have
˜lnψi ≡ (lnψi1, lnψi2, ..., lnψiJ̄)′ = (lnf̂ ′1(Si1)−
1
µ1







Let us assume that ˜lnψi ∼ N(0,Σ), where
Σ =













Clearly, as the dimension of ˜lnψi grows, the computation burden mainly comes from
estimation of the variance-covariance matrix Σ. Therefore, we should not estimate the
implicit price elasticities for too many amenities if the data set is not large enough.
Similar to (31), the MLE estimators for µ1, ..., µJ̄ and Σ are given by:




ln {l(µ1, µ2, ..., µJ̄ ,Σ;Si1, ..., SiJ̄)} (34)
where









) |det(∂(lnψi1, ..., lnψiJ̄)
∂(Si1, ..., SiJ̄)
)|


















Suppose Sj is one of the amenities of interest, f̂
′
j(Sij) is the first-order derivative estimate
from the first-step semi-nonparametric regression, µ̂j is the estimate of the implicit price
elasticity of the demand for Sj and ψ̂ij is the estimate of the true ψij, then replacing fj, µj














It is worth noting that after the first-step and the second-step estimation, all the compo-
nents on the right-hand-side of (35) are either observed or estimated. Thus based on (35), we
can calculate ψ̂ij, which characterizes the household type for each household i in the sample.
And a plot of ψ̂ij against Sij tells us the household type that sorts into any observed amenity
level Sij in the equilibrium. To some extent, the plot of ψ̂ij against Sij nonparametrically
characterizes the sorting equilibrium relationship, as opposed to the parametric relationship
estimated by Yinger(2015b).
After calculation of ψ̂ij for each household i in the sample, the bid function for each
household type that sorts into an observed amenity level can be recovered up to a constant.
Thus it is possible to measure the welfare implication of a counterfactual change in the
amenity level. Specifically, the relative change in willingness to pay of the household type
who sorts into an observed amenity level, Sij, due to a counterfactual non-marginal increase
in Sij, denoted by ∆Sj, is given by:
P̂ (Sij + ∆Sj, ~Si,−j; ψ̂ij)− P̂ (Sij, ~Si,−j; ψ̂ij)
























where P̂ (.) is the before-tax bid function given by (14), ~Si,−j is a vector of all the amenities
except Sj and ψ̂ij is given by (35).
Finally, based on the expression of ψj given by (13), we can run a regression of log(ψ̂j)
on logY where Y is the household income, as a simple test for normal sorting. Under the
assumption of single-crossing, a household type characterized by a larger ψj has a steeper
bid function and thus ends up sorting into a higher amenity level in the equilibrium. In
other words, the amenity level into which a given household type sorts in the equilibrium is
positively correlated with the corresponding ψj of that household type. Therefore, if we find
that ψj is also positively correlated with Y, we can conclude that the household with higher
income indeed ends up sorting into a higher amenity level, which verifies normal sorting.
Yinger(2015b) implements a similar test and points out that according to the theorem for
omitted variable bias, the coefficient of logY in the regression of log(ψ̂j) on logY captures the
impact of both household income and other factors in the demand of the household for the
amenity which not only correlate with the household income but also cause the household
to bid higher for each amenity level.
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Can we drop the assumption ν = −1?
One might question whether it is necessary to assume ν = −1. Recognizing the mathe-
matical connection between the bid function envelope and the amenity demand function, if
we do not assume ν = −1, the bid function envelope will not have the additively separable
form as (20). Without assuming the value of ν, the bid function envelope might have the
following form:





1+ν + εi (37)
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Plugging (37) into (20), we have the following estimating equation instead:





1+ν + lnH( ~Xi) + βτ
∗
i + εi (38)
While in theory ν might be directly estimated from (38) under some identification re-
striction, it is computationally impossible to estimate such a complicated nonlinear equa-
tion, especially when the unknown function fj is nonparametrically estimated using the
series method. Under the assumption that ν = −1, the estimating equation is in practice
a linear regression. Thus, assuming ν = −1 greatly facilitates the first-step semiparametric
estimation of the bid function envelope.
3.4.2 Possible contradiction between the data and the assumptions in the theo-
retic model
The first possible contradiction between the real data and the theoretic model is related to
the derivative estimates from the first-step regression. In the theoretic model, it is assumed
that the bid function envelope is upward-sloping everywhere, which means any amenity is
enjoyed by all households. However, the semi-nonparametric estimation of the bid-function
envelope provides no guarantee that the estimated bid-function envelope will have a positive
slope at each data point with respect to any given amenity. For example, despite evidence of
positive capitalization of public school quality into property value(Nguyen-Hoang, 2011), it
is entirely possible that not all households prefer living close to a high-scoring public school
due to existence of private and charter schools. Another example is related to neighborhood
ethnic composition. There has been evidence that households’ preferences for neighborhood
ethnic composition vary widely(Yinger, 2014), which also implies that the bid-function en-
velope for some measure of neighborhood ethnic composition might not be upward-sloping
everywhere.
Mathematically, the negative slope with respect to some amenity at a given point on
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the bid function envelope implies that the left-hand-side of (24) is negative for some Sij,
which directly contradicts (24), since the right-hand-side of (24) is always positive by con-
struction. Since (24) is the key to further derivation of the Maximum Likelihood estimator
of the implicit price elasticity, a contradiction to (24) makes it impossible to estimate the
price elasticity using Maximum Likelihood method. Recognizing that (24) is derived based
on the assumption of constant elasticity demand for a given amenity, such contradiction also
implies that it might not be appropriate to model the household preferences for that amenity
and the housing service with the constant elasticity demand function.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that an additively separable bid function envelope
given by (20) does not require a constant elasticity demand function for each amenity that
nonlinearly enters (20) as an argument of the nonparametrically specified function fj. Ac-
tually, even if only one amenity has a constant elasticity demand function, it is still possible
that the bid function envelope has the same functional form as (20). Therefore, whether
the assumption of constant elasticity demand is an appropriate choice to model preferences
or not, we can always run the first-step semi-nonparametric regression given by (21) and
then let the data tell us for which amenities we can assume a constant elasticity demand
and for which we should not, based on the first-order derivative estimates from the first-step
regression. In practice, if there is only a few observations with negative slope estimates, we
can drop those observations and interpret the price elasticity estimate as an estimate on a
true price elasticity that applies to a subpopulation who enjoy the amenity of interest. As
long as the observations we drop only account for a small portion of the original sample, it
is reasonable to believe that the subpopulation to which our estimate applies accounts for
the majority of the whole population, in which case the estimate is still meaningful to policy
makers.
The second possible contradiction between the data and the theoretic model is related
to the one-to-one matching relationship between the relative slope that characterizes the
household type, ψj, and the amenity level into which that household type sorts in the equi-
61
librium, Sj. While the assumption of one-to-one matching is not explicitly imposed in the
theoretic model described in Section II, it is directly implied by the standard single-crossing
property. On the other hand, since I do not impose such restriction of single-crossing during
estimation, it is possible that the plot of the estimated relationship between ψ̂ij and Sij in
the sorting equilibrium, given by (35), does not look like a one-to-one matching.
To see how this can happen, let us take derivatives on both sides of (29), which charac-













> 0 for all Sij, which implies a one-to-one matching. On the other
hand, an equilibrium relationship between ψij and Sij that is not a one-to-one matching
might appear when f ′′j (.) is not always positive, which means the hedonic price function
is not strictly convex anywhere. While in the first-step estimation, I choose to estimate a
relatively general form of the bid function envelope which is additively separable and allows
for non-convexity, it comes at a price of possible contradiction between the real data and the
theoretic model.
For any approach of structural estimation, one major concern is whether the assumptions
imposed to make estimation tractable well approximate the true data-generating process or
not. While the above two types of possible contradiction between the real data and the
theoretic model do reveal some limitation of my new approach to estimate the implicit price
elasticity of the amenity demand, the ways to detect such contradiction can in turn serve as
relatively rough tests for whether those key assumptions are good enough to model the true
data-generating process. If there are few signs of contradiction between the real data and the
model assumptions, then to some extent, we have more reasons to believe that the estimates
are credible. Besides, the additively separable form of the bid function envelope given by
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(20) guarantees that contradiction between the real data and the theoretic model detected
during estimation for one amenity will not affect the estimation for another amenity, which
greatly strengthens the usefulness of my approach. Therefore, we can always implement the
first-step and the second-step estimation and then tell for which amenity our estimate on
the implicit price elasticity of demand is credible and for which amenity our estimate is not,
based on the estimation result.
In summary, after the first-step and the second-step estimation, for a given amenity of
interest, Sj, we might be facing the following two cases:
Case 1. The first-step semi-nonparametric regression given by (20) yields too many negative
first-order derivative estimates.
Case 2. The plot of the estimated relationship between ψ̂ij and Sij given by (35) does not
look like a one-to-one matching.
While Case 1 indicates that not all the households enjoy and value the amenity of interest,
Case 2 suggests that the bid function envelope for Sj is not strictly convex anywhere. Either
of the two cases implies a contradiction between the real data and the theoretic model for
the given amenity Sj, which means that my approach is not appropriate for estimation of
the implicit price elasticity of demand for amenity Sj and that the estimate my approach
yields for amenity Sj is not as reliable as the estimate for other amenities with few signs of
contradiction.
4. Data
The data set used for application in this study comes from Yinger(2015b), which includes
1665 neighborhood(defined as Census Block Groups, CBGs) fixed effect estimates and a
variety of neighborhood traits. Based on a data set that consists of all the house sales in
Cleveland MSA in 2000, Yinger(2015b) estimates the CBG fixed effect from the following
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linear regression:
lnVi = C +
∑
n
αnDin + lnH( ~Xi) + fQ( ~Qi) + ε
1
i (40)
where i is the index for a house, n is the index for a neighborhood, Vi is the sales price,
~Xi is a vector of seventeen housing attributes, Din is a dummy variable which equals 1 if
house i is in neighborhood n, αn is the fixed effect for neighborhood n, ~Qi is a vector of
distance-based within-neighborhood differences in nine locational traits, including distance
to worksites, to the nearest public elementary school, to the nearest private school, to the
nearest environmental hazard, to Lake Erie, to the black ghetto, to the Cleveland airport, to
the center of the CBG, and to a high-crime location. With so many explanatory variables,
as is checked by Yinger(2015b) using a placebo test, it is unlikely that some key variable is
omitted. Both lnH( ~Xi) and fQ( ~Qi) are specified as linear functions of elements in vectors
~Xi and ~Qi respectively.
As is pointed out by Yinger(2015b), the neighborhood fixed effect estimate, denoted by
α̂n, ”indicates the impact on house values of all the neighborhood traits shared by houses
in CBG n”, which therefore can be conceptually thought of as the housing price for CBG n.
Recognizing that using lnVi as the dependent variable and applying (21) to the original house-
level data set used by Yinger(2015b) is equivalent to using α̂n as the dependent variables and
applying (20) to the neighborhood-level data set, I estimate the following equation instead




fj(Snj) + f̃(S̃n) + ~β
′~τ ∗+εn (41)
With slight abuse of notation compared to (20), now Snj corresponds to the j’th amenity
shared by the houses in neighborhood n and selected to have a nonparametric component
in (41), j=1,2,...,J∗. The vector S̃n includes all the remaining amenities. f̃ is specified as a
linear function. In order to allow different types of tax to be capitalized into the property
value differently, ~β and ~τ∗ are specified as two vectors instead of scalars in (21). Replacing
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the index i for a house by the index n for a neighborhood, the Maximum Likelihood estimator
given by (34) and the following post-estimation analysis still applies to the estimates from
the the modified version of the first-step regression given by (41).
While a thorough introduction of the data set can be found in Yinger(2015b), the first two
columns of Table A1(See Appendix A) briefly introduce all the 66 explanatory variables in the
first-step regression (41), including several school quality measures, two ethnic composition
measures, dummies for nearby amenities, distance from CBG to nearby amenities, tax rates
and higher-order terms of some continuous amenity measures. As is previously mentioned,
the purpose of including those high-order terms in (41) is to approximate a bid-function
envelope that is consistent with sorting among heterogeneous households. Four variables are
selected to nonlinearly enter (41) as arguments of the nonparametrically specified smooth
functions, fj’s, including the difference between the passing rate on five exams(mathematics,
reading, writing, science, and citizenship) in the nearest elementary school and the aver-
age passing rate in the school district (Relative Elementary Score), the district’s passing
rate on twelfth grade tests (High School Passing Rate) and two ethnic composition mea-
sures(Share Non-black and Share Non-hispanic). Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics
for the dependent variable and those selected key variables. For ease of later presentation,
the four selected variables and the corresponding nonparametrically specified functions are
respectively labeled by Sj and fj(j=1,2,3,4).
5. Estimation Result
5.1 First-step estimation
Besides the variable name and the corresponding definition, Table A1 also presents the co-
efficient estimate from the first-step regression for each variable in S̃n and the corresponding
standard error in the third and fourth columns respectively. For the four selected variables,
the first-order and the second-order derivatives can be estimated from the first-step semi-
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nonparametric regression (41) at each observed value in the data set. As is introduced in
Section 3, a sequence of B-spline basis functions of degree three with Kj knots is chosen to ap-
proximate fj(j=1,2,3,4). And we need to implement a generalized cross-validation procedure






4 , so as to construct
sequences of basis functions that can best approximate f1, f2, f3, f4 respectively. In prac-
tice, a grid search is implemented for each Kj from 1 to 5. Among the 625 combinations of
(K1,K2,K3,K4), the optimal combination is (4,1,1,4). Table 2 presents the summary statis-
tics of the first-order derivative estimates(f̂ ′j) and the second-order derivative estimates(f̂
′′
j )
for each variable Sj, j=1,2,3,4. And the estimated shapes of the nonparametrically-specified
function fj(j=1,2,3,4) are respectively plotted in Figure 1, where the function value of each
fj is adjusted by a constant so that all the function values fall into the interval [0,1]. More-
over, Figure 2 plots the point estimates of the first-order derivative of each fj(j=1,2,3,4)
respectively, marked by green points, and the lower and upper bounds of the correspond-
ing 95% confidence interval, marked by red points. Similarly, in Figure 3, green points are
the point estimates of the second-order derivative of each fj(j=1,2,3,4) and red points are
the bounds of the corresponding 95% confidence interval. The confidence interval for each
derivative estimate is constructed based on the bootstrapped percentiles.
The last column of Table 2 also presents the number of negative values among the first-
order derivative estimates for each variable. As we can see, a majority of derivative estimates
for S3(Relative Elementary Score) are negative, suggesting that a large number of households
think of proximity to a low-scoring public elementary school as an amenity. To understand
this odd phenomenon, we need to look back to the history of Cleveland School District(SD).
Starting in 1996-1997, vouchers used to cover private school tuition were granted by lottery
to households in Cleveland SD. And by 2001 there are also 7 elementary charter schools in
Cleveland SD placed near low-scoring public elementary school. Therefore, if a household in
Cleveland SD believe their child can get into a private or charter school near a low-scoring
public elementary school, they will find the location near that low-scoring public elementary
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school attractive. Even with a fixed effect included in the regression to take into account the
impact of proximity to a private school or a charter school on the equilibrium hedonic price,
the existence of the private elementary schools and the elementary charter schools might still
alter the slope and curvature of the bid-function envelope in terms of the public elementary
school quality. It is also worth noting that since East Cleveland SD does not have so many
elementary charter school and grant vouchers to cover private school tuition, the bid-function
envelopes for public elementary school quality are likely to have different shapes for Cleveland
SD and East Cleveland SD. While Yinger(2015b), who derives and parametrically estimates
a nonlinear bid-function envelope using the same data set, proposes estimating two separate
bid-function envelopes for Cleveland SD and East Cleveland SD, my semi-nonparametric
specification of the first-step regression given by (41) does not separate the estimation of
the bid-function envelopes for Cleveland SD and East Cleveland SD. Thus, my first-order
derivative estimate f̂ ′3 should be better thought of as an estimate on the weighted average of
the two first-order derivatives with respect to S3 calculated from two separate bid-function
envelopes for Cleveland SD and East Cleveland SD at each point of observed values. Since
I do not intend to implement the second-step Maximum Likelihood estimation based on my
first-step derivative estimates with respect to S3, the complication of differences in education
investment between Cleveland SD and East Cleveland SD will not cause any problem.
Besides, a large fraction of derivative estimates for S4(Share Non-black) are negative,
which means that many households prefer a neighborhood with a large black population to
one with a small black population. No matter why a household does not value S3 or S4, it is
not appropriate to impose the assumption of constant elasticity demand, which is required
for derivation of the second-step Maximum Likelihood estimator, on the preferences over
S3 and S4, which means it is impossible to get estimates on the implicit price elasticity of
demand for S3 and S4 using the approach proposed in this paper.
On the other hand, only a small fraction of the first-order derivative estimates for S1(High
School Passing Rate) and S2(Share Non-hispanic) are negative, which makes it possible to
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proceed to the second step after dropping observations with negative first-order derivative
estimates for S1 and S2. Table 3 below presents the summary statistics of the resulting data
set used for second-step estimation after dropping 187 observations with negative first-order
derivative estimates for S1 and S2. It is worth noting that most dropped derivative estimates
are those inaccurate ones with relatively wide confidence interval.
5.2 Second-step estimation
According to (34), in the case of two amenities, five parameters need to be estimated from
the second step using the Maximum Likelihood method, including the implicit price elasticity
of demand for S1 and S2, denoted by µ1 and µ2 respectively, and three parameters in the
variance-covariance matrix Σ, denoted by σ1, σ2 and σ12, following the same notation as in
(34). Table 4 below presents the Maximum Likelihood estimates for the five parameters, all
of which are statistically significant at 1h level. As we can see, the implicit price elasticity
of demand for the high school quality measured by high school passing rate is -3.0029,
suggesting that if the implicit hedonic price of high school quality decreases by one percent,
a household is willing to move to a location close to a high school with a passing rate that
is at most 3.0029 percent higher. It is worth noting that the estimate only applies to a
subpopulation who value high school quality. Similarly, for another amenity of interest, the
neighborhood population share of the non-hispanic, the estimation result suggests that a
household, who prefers a neighborhood with a large non-hispanic population to one with
a small non-hispanic population, is willing to move to a neighborhood with a population
share of the non-hispanic that is at most 0.8226 percent higher, if the corresponding implicit
hedonic price decreases by one percent.
5.3 Characterization of the sorting equilibrium
Based on (35), Figure 4 consists of two plots for the estimated relationship between
ψ̂nj(j=1,2) on the vertical axis, which characterizes the household type of households in
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neighborhood n, and the amenity level Snj(j=1,2) on the horizontal axis into which that
household type sorts in the equilibrium. Since all households in a given neighborhood n con-
sumes the same amenity level of Snj, by definition of the household type and the assumption
of one-to-one matching, all the households in neighborhood n belong to the same household
type with respect to amenity Sj, which means they are characterized by the same value of
ψnj.
Figure 4(a) corresponds to High School Passing Rate(S1) while Figure 4(b) corresponds
to Share Non-hispanic(S2). Each point in a plot corresponds to an observed amenity level
in the sample. As we can see, the estimated relationship for High School Passing Rate(S1)
does not look like a one-to-one matching, as opposed to the estimated relationship for Share
Non-hispanic(S2). So we can conclude that the estimate of the implicit price elasticity of
demand for amenity S1 is not as reliable as that for amenity S2.
5.4 A simple test for normal sorting
As is previously discussed in Section 3, a simple regression of the estimated ψ̂nj on the
median household income in census block group n, denoted by Y Mn , provides a test on normal
sorting. To be concrete, I run the following regressions:
ψ̂nj = b0j + b1jY
M
n + enj j = 1, 2 (42)
where b1j is the coefficient of interest, enj is the error term, j=1 corresponds to High School
Passing Rate(S1) and j=2 corresponds to Share Non-hispanic(S2).
Table 5 reports the estimates on b1j(j=1,2), denoted by b̂1j(j=1,2), and the corresponding
standard error. As we can see, both estimates for S1 and S2 are positive and statistically
significant, which provides evidence for normal sorting.
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5.5 Change in willingness to pay due to a counterfactual change in
amenity
Considering a one-percentage-point increase in the neighborhood population share of
non-hispanic, I plot in Figure 5 the estimated relative change in willingness to pay of each
household type(characterized by ψn2) who sorts into an observed amenity level(Sn2). In Fig-
ure 5, the horizontal axis corresponds to ψ̂n2 given by (35) while the vertical axis corresponds
to the estimated relative change in willingness to pay of households in each neighborhood
n, which is calculated based on (36). Table 6 presents several quantiles and the mean of the
estimated relative change in willingness to pay of households in each neighborhood in the
sample. The mean reported in Table 6 suggests that the household in Cleveland MSA on
average is willing to pay 0.61417% more for a one-percentage-point increase in the neighbor-
hood population share of non-hispanic.
6. Estimation Following Bishop and Timmins(2019)
Following the procedure proposed by Bishop and Timmins(2019), I estimate a semi-




fj(Snj) + f̃(S̃n) + ~β
′~τ ∗+εn (43)
It is worth noting that the only difference between (41) and (43) lies in the right-hand-side
dependent variable. We have eαn in (43) as opposed to αn in (41).
Instead of the constant elasticity demand assumed in my approach, Bishop and Tim-
mins(2019) assume the following linear MWTP function for a given amenity of interest Sj:
P ′(Snj) = α1 + α2Snj + α3Zn + vnj (44)
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where n is still the index of census block groups, vnj is an unobserved preference shock in the
MWTP function that captures heterogeneities in preferences for amenity Sj as opposed to
ψnj in my approach, Snj is the amenity of interest(Share Non-hispanic), Zn is the household
attribute(Median household income in CBG).
Recognizing that P ′(Snj) can be semi-nonparametrically estimated from (43), we have
P̂ ′(.) = f̂ ′j(.) (45)
Replacing P ′(Snj) in (44) by P̂
′(Snj) and plugging (45) into (44), we have
vnj = f̂
′
j(Snj)− α1 − α2Snj − α3Zn (46)
If we assume vi ∼ N(0, σ2), then a standard Maximum Likelihood Procedure will give
us estimate of α1, α2 and α3, denoted by α̂1, α̂2 and α̂3 respectively.
With α̂1, α̂2 and α̂3, the estimated MWTP function is given by
P̂ ′(Snj; α̂1, α̂2, α̂3) = α̂1 + α̂2Snj + α̂3Zn (47)









As we can tell from (48), due to a different assumption on the preferences for amenities,
the implicit price elasticity in Bishop and Timmins(2019) varies across households, as op-
posed to the constant implicit price elasticity in my approach. Each blue point in Figure
6 corresponds to an estimate of the implicit price elasticity of a household who sort into
an observed amenity level, calculated following Bishop and Timmins(2019), while the hor-
izontal line in the same plot represents the estimate from my approach, which is -0.8226.
Table 7 reports several quantiles and the mean of those estimates of implicit price elasticity
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calculated with the procedure proposed by Bishop and Timmins(2019).
7. Conclusion
This study is broadly related to a large literature on recovery of heterogeneous preferences
for various goods. Motivated by previous studies on approaches to recover heterogeneous
preferences for public goods and amenities using hedonic techniques, this paper proposes
an alternative approach to recover the implicit price elasticity of amenity demand, where
a likelihood-based estimator for the implicit price elasticity is derived from the theory of
bidding and sorting. My approach accounts for both observed and unobserved heterogeneities
in preferences for amenities of interest and avoids the well-known endogeneity in the Rosen
two-step procedure. It also allows for characterization of the sorting equilibrium and partial
recovery of the bid function up to a constant for each household type that sorts into an
observed amenity level, which makes it possible to measure the relative change in willingness
to pay. One major drawback of my approach is that it does not always work since the real
data might contradict the theoretic model I use to construct the estimator. On the other
hand, I still believe my approach is useful not only because such contradiction can be easily
detected in post-estimation analysis but also because in a simultaneous estimation for several
amenities, contradiction between the real data and the model for one amenity will not affect
estimation for another amenity. I apply this approach to a cross-sectional hedonic data set of
Cleveland MSA, which is previously used by Yinger(2015b), and estimate the implicit price
elasticity of demand for public high school quality and neighborhood ethnic composition.
I also implement the procedure proposed by Bishop and Timmins(2019) and compare the
results.
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Figure 2: First-order Derivative Estimates of fj(Sj)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Note: Point Estimates of the derivatives are marked by green points, while the lower and upper bounds
of the corresponding 95% confidence interval are marked by red points. The confidence interval for each
derivative estimate is constructed based on the bootstrapped percentiles.
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Figure 3: Second-order Derivative Estimates of fj(Sj)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Note: Point Estimates of the derivatives are marked by green points, while the lower and upper bounds
of the corresponding 95% confidence interval are marked by red points. The confidence interval for each
derivative estimate is constructed based on the bootstrapped percentiles.
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Figure 4: Estimated Sorting Equilibrium Relationship
(a) (b)
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Figure 5: Change in Willingness to Pay due to a Counterfactual Change in the
Amenity Level
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Figure 6: Estimated Implicit Price Elasticity Following Bishop and Tim-
mins(2019)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Selected Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CBG fixed effect(α) 11.32322 .2202871 10.69027 12.0327
High School Passing Rate(S1) .3277706 .1978837 .0491107 .693232
Share Non-hispanic(S2)
a .9671389 .0659245 .4643102 .998
Relative Elementary Score(S3)
b .3168498 .0905774 .001 .6465
Share Non-black(S4)
a .8211675 .3119428 .001 1
Note: Total number of observations is 1665
a 0.001 added to avoid zero values (unless initial value is 1.0)
b Constant added to make all values positive
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Derivative Estimates
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # Negative Value
f̂ ′1 0.3941 0.7862 -4.4056 1.6949 183
f̂ ′′1 -10.2363 22.2507 -90.2932 20.8211 -
f̂ ′2 0.6057 0.1556 -3.4231 0.6227 8
f̂ ′′2 0.1958 2.5729 -.0987 54.2932 -
f̂ ′3 0.0451 0.3929 -0.1058 4.4434 1173
f̂ ′′3 0.0099 6.5913 -7.6002 56.5461 -
f̂ ′4 0.0706 0.5055 -1.9216 0.7730 754
f̂ ′′4 -4.2286 12.3012 -12.9459 34.1182 -
Note: Total number of observations is 1665
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Table 3: Summary Statistics after Dropping Observations
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
S1 0.3278 0.1979 0.0491 0.6932
f̂ ′1 0.6065 0.3938 0.1052 1.6949
f̂ ′′1 -9.8949 19.8152 -40.9233 20.8211
S2 0.9671 0.0659 0.4643 0.9980
f̂ ′2 0.6161 0.0343 0.0230 0.6227
f̂ ′′2 0.0203 0.6739 -0.0987 15.3507
Note: Total number of observations is 1478
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Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimation Result
Parameter µ1 µ2 σ1 σ2 σ12
Estimates -3.0029∗∗∗ -0.8226∗∗∗ 0.4356∗∗∗ 3.6579∗∗∗ 1.2622∗∗∗
(1.3924e-05) (1.5264e-04) (8.3595e-06) (7.0204e-05) (2.4226e-05)
Note: The standard error is in the parentheses.
∗∗∗ represents statistical significance at 1h level.
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Table 5: Test for Normal Sorting
Amenity b̂1 Std. Error




Note: ∗∗∗ represents statistical significance at 1h level.
Table 6: Quantiles and Mean of the Estimated Relative Change
25% Quantile Median 75% Quantile Mean
0.61914% 0.61953% 0.62029% 0.61417%
Table 7: Quantiles and Mean of the Implicit Price Elasticity
25% Quantile Median 75% Quantile Mean




Variable Name Definition Coefficient Std.Error
High School Passing Rate The district’s passing rate
on twelfth grade tests
- -
Share Non-hispanic Neighborhood population
share of the non-hispanic
- -
Relative Elementary Score The test scores of the neigh-
borhood elementary school
relative to the district aver-
age
- -
Share Non-black Neighborhood population
share of the non-black
- -
Commute 1 Average employment-
weighted distance to five
major worksites in Cleve-
land MSA
6.186e-04 3.127e-03
Commute 2 (Commute 1) squared -1.678e-05 7.746e-05
Value Added 1 School district’s 6th grade
passing rate on 5 state
tests in 2000–2001 minus its
4th grade passing rate in
1998–99
1.144e-02∗∗ 3.997e-03
Value Added 2 (Value Added 1) squared -1.951e-04∗∗ 7.369e-05
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Coefficient Std.Error
Minority Teachers 1 The share of minority
teachers in the school
district
4.186e-01∗ 2.051e-01
Minority Teachers 2 (Minority Teachers 1)
squared
-9.998e-01∗ 4.233e-01
Income Tax Rate School district income tax
rate
-1.929 3.890
School Tax Rate School district effective
property tax rate
6.034∗∗∗ 1.162
City Tax Rate Effective city property tax
rate beyond school tax
5.007e-01 1.439
Tax Break Rate Exemption rate for city
property tax
-3.059e-01 2.001
No A-to-S Dummy: No A/V data -7.054e-02∗ 3.148e-02
Not a City CBG not in a city 2.528e-02 3.688e-02
Crime Lowhigh Low property crime rate,
high violent crime rate
-7.105e-02∗ 3.024e-02
Crime Highlow High property crime rate,
low violent crime rate
-2.128e-02 1.393e-02
Crime Highhigh High property crime rate,
high violent crime rate
-5.761e-02∗∗ 1.960e-02
Crime Hotspot1 CBG within 1/2 mile of
crime hot spot
-1.856e-01∗∗∗ 4.406e-02
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Coefficient Std.Error
Crime Hotspot2 CBG 1/2 to 1 mile from
crime hot spot
-5.971e-02 3.294e-02
Crime Hotspot3 CBG 1 to 2 miles from
crime hot spot
-8.482e-02∗∗ 2.821e-02
Crime Hotspot4 CBG 2 to 5 miles from
crime hot spot
-3.080e-02 1.702e-02
County Police CBG receives police from a
county
-1.823e-01∗∗∗ 3.595e-02
Village CBG receives police from a
village
-1.006e-01∗∗ 3.717e-02
Township CBG receives police from a
township
-1.189e-01∗ 5.695e-02
City Population Population of city (if CBG
in a city)
-2.352e-05∗∗∗ 3.587e-06
City Population Squared City population
squared/10000
6.037e-06∗∗∗ 9.939e-07
City Population Cubed City population
cubed/100002
-4.988e-07∗∗∗ 8.741e-08
City Population to Fourth City pop. to the fourth
power/100003
7.728e-09∗∗∗ 1.379e-09
Smog CBG within 20 miles of air
pollution cluster
-2.182e-01∗∗∗ 6.076e-02
Smog Distance Smog × distance to cluster
(not to the northwest)
8.111e-03∗ 3.355e-03
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Coefficient Std.Error
Near Hazard CBG is within 1 mile of a
hazardous waste site
-6.022e-02∗∗∗ 1.676e-02
Distance to Hazard Distance to nearest haz-
ardous waste site (if < 1
mile)
8.011e-02∗∗∗ 2.153e-02
Cleveland Dummy for Cleveland and
East Cleveland SD
-5.035e-03 1.115e-01
Near Public CBG is within 2 miles of
public elem. school
-4.056e-03 1.959e-02
Distance to Public (Near Public) × distance to
public school
-2.196e-02∗ 1.083e-02
Near Private CBG is within 5 miles of a
private school
8.435e-02∗∗∗ 2.085e-02
Distance to Private (Near Private) × distance
to private school
-9.590e-03∗ 4.661e-03
Lakefront Within 2 miles of Lake Erie 6.004e-02∗∗ 2.066e-02
Distance to Lake (Lakefront) × distance to
Lake Erie
-2.490e-02 1.553e-02
Snowbelt 1 (East of Pepper Pike) ×
(Distance to Lake Erie)
2.726e-02∗∗∗ 6.749e-03
Snowbelt 2 (Snowbelt 1) squared -1.089e-032∗∗ 4.183e-04
Getto CBG in the black ghetto -2.778e-03 4.243e-02
Near Ghetto CBG within 5 miles of
ghetto center
6.141e-03 2.347e-02
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Coefficient Std.Error
Near Airport CBG within 10 miles of
Cleveland airport
-3.247e-02 3.489e-02
Airport Distance (Near Airport) × (Distance
to airport)
5.631e-03 4.176e-03
Local Amenities Number of parks, golf
courses, rivers, or lakes
within 1/4 mile of CBG
1.790e-02∗ 7.802e-03
Freeway CBG within 1/4 mile of
freeway
1.462e-02 1.163e-02
Shopping CBG within 1 mile of shop-
ping center
-1.202e-02 9.591e-03
Hospital CBG within 1 mile of hos-
pital
1.381e-02 9.990e-03
Small airport CBG within 1 mile of small
airport
2.627e-02 2.574e-02
Big Park CBG within 1 mile of re-
gional park
7.804e-03 1.356e-02
Railroad CBG within 1/4 mile of
railroad
-3.300e-02∗∗∗ 9.830e-03
Historic District CBG within an historic dis-
trict
1.203e-03 1.520e-02
Near Elderly PH CBG within 1/2 mile of el-
derly public housing
-1.989e-02 1.908e-02
Continued on next page
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Table A1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Name Definition Coefficient Std.Error
Near Small Family PH CBG within 1/2 mile of
small family public housing
-2.122e-02 2.600e-02
Near Big Family PH CBG within 1/2 mile of
large family public housing
(>200 units)
-8.589e-02∗∗ 3.225e-02
Worksite 2 Fixed effect for worksite 2 5.215e-02∗∗∗ 1.539e-02
Worksite 3 Fixed effect for worksite 3 5.387e-02 3.622e-02
Worksite 4 Fixed effect for worksite 4 4.152e-02 2.804e-02
Worksite 5 Fixed effect for worksite 5 -4.799e-02 2.505e-02
Geauga Fixed effect for Geauga
County
-5.868e-02 4.152e-02
Lake Fixed effect for Lake
County
1.607e-01∗∗∗ 3.634e-02
Lorain Fixed effect for Lorain
County
4.873e-02 2.840e-02
Medina Fixed effect for Medina
County
-1.088e-01∗∗ 3.839e-02
∗∗∗ represents statistical significance at 1h level.
∗∗ represents statistical significance at 1% level.
∗ represents statistical significance at 5% level.
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Steering and Spatial Mismatch





In the United States, labor market outcomes, such as unemployment rates, have long been
less favorable for blacks and Hispanics than for whites. These labor market disparities appear
to have a geographic dimension. As is pointed out by Kain(1968), two common phenomena
in American cities, namely, the central location of many segregated black or Hispanic neigh-
borhoods and the suburbanization of jobs, lead to a mismatch between residential location
and job access for these minority groups. This mismatch could be resolved, of course, if
black and Hispanic households could move to the suburbs with better job access. However,
according to Kain’s Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis (SMH), this type of move is prevented by
racial discrimination in the housing market. This paper provides the first direct test of the
role housing discrimination plays in preventing black and Hispanic households from moving
closer to jobs. In particular, we determine whether housing agents manipulate minority
home seekers’ choice sets by steering them away from neighborhoods with good job access
and thereby worsen their employment prospects.
Kain’s hypothesis has inspired a large empirical literature. Most of the early literature
reviewed by Kain(1968), Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist(1998), Houston(2005), etc., attempts to
test SMH by examining the correlation between job access and labor market outcomes. Ac-
cording to SMH, indeed, poorer access to jobs will lead to worse labor market outcomes.
However, a regression that relates job access and labor market outcomes is confronted with
a couple of empirical challenges including not only standard omitted variable bias but also
endogeneity of households’ locational choice, which are hard to address.
Some recent articles partially overcome some of those empirical challenges. Boustan and
Margo(2009) examines the historical evolution of racial differences in employment at the
United States Postal Service(USPS) and find that blacks have been substituting towards
postal work as other employment opportunities left the city since 1960. Recognizing that
USPS is one large employer that has remained in the central city throughout the twentieth
century, they argue that working for postal service is a labor market outcome that is associ-
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ated with spatial mismatch but is unlikely to be positively correlated with unobserved factors
that cause households to live in isolated neighborhood, which pins down the direction of bias
caused by endogeneity. Andersson et al.(2018) make use of longitudinal data on workers’ job
search after a mass layoff, which they believe is exogenous to workers’ previous residential
location choice. And they find that better job access significantly decreases the duration of
joblessness among low-paid displaced workers, which implies that job accessibility matters
for employment. Hellerstein et al.(2008) find that access to jobs does not lead to better labor
market outcomes for blacks if those jobs are currently held by whites. They interpret this
result as a sign of labor market discrimination, not spatial mismatch.
As opposed to previous studies in SMH literature, this paper does not examine the re-
lationship between some measure of job access and labor market outcomes in order to test
SMH. Instead, we directly look at the underlying mechanism proposed by Kain’s SMH,
which is housing discrimination that denies minorities to job opportunities. By doing that,
we avoid the endogeneity issue faced by SMH literature. Based on an audit study of housing
discrimination and employment data, we compare the job access of houses recommended
by housing agents to white homebuyers and houses recommended to minority homebuyers.
And the mechanism of housing discrimination behind SMH is consistent with a systemati-
cally worse job access of houses recommended to minority homebuyers.
Besides SMH literature, this paper has a clear connection with another strand of literature
on steering behavior of housing agents. As is reviewed by Oh and Yinger(2015), this type of
behavior has been studied using data from the 1989, 2000, and 2012 Housing Discrimination
Studies. Those Housing Discrimination Studies employed a matched-pair block randomized
methodology. Each trial began with a randomly selected advertisement. Then in each trial,
two identically qualified auditors made separate visits to the housing agent who placed the
advertisement. Both auditors were instructed not to reveal any neighborhood preferences
except for the implicit one associated with their inquiry about the advertised units. This is a
crucial instruction for Housing Discrimination Studies, because it ensures that any observed
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steering comes from the agent, not the auditor. Moreover, such instruction addresses one
major challenge in the literature on steering, which is to disentangle discriminatory steering
from preference-based sorting.
One important paper on steering that motivates this study is Christensen and Tim-
mins(2018), who provide experimental evidence on discriminatory steering of housing agents
for multiple neighborhood traits including the poverty rate, the crime rate, the education
level, and distance from a superfund site. In this paper, we employ the same empirical strat-
egy proposed by Christensen and Timmins(2018) but consider a new neighborhood trait
that has not been studied in previous literature on steering, which is access to jobs. To our
knowledge, our study is the first one testing whether steering behavior of housing agents
denies minorities access to job opportunities. We not only find some more evidence on dis-
criminatory steering but also relate our evidence to the role discriminatory steering plays in
causing the spatial mismatch.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the two data sets used for our empir-
ical analysis. Section 3 introduces our estimating equation together with variable definition.
Section 4 discusses our estimation results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
The empirical analysis of this paper relies on two data sets. The first data set comes from
2012 Housing Discrimination Studies(HDS2012) conducted by the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development. HDS2012 is an in-person audit study which employs
matched-pair block randomized methodology. Over 8000 trials were conducted in this study.
In each trial, a white auditor is paired with a minority auditor. Both of them are assigned
with a number of characteristics so that both are equally qualified for buying or renting a
house. A typical trial for auditors begins with an advertised unit drawn from a random
sample of real estate advertisements. Then in a random sequence, the two auditors visit the
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corresponding local real estate agency separately. During the in-person visit, each auditor
will first ask about the availability of the advertised unit and then ask the housing agent for
other recommendations. HDS 2012 Data contain information of all the units recommended
by the housing agent to an auditor who pretended to be a homebuyer, including the address,
the number of bedrooms and the price.
Besides HDS2012 Data, the job access measure is constructed using data from Origin-
Destination Employment Statistics(LODES) released by Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics(LEHD). LODES consist of three data sets. Origin-Destination(OD) Data Set
reports job totals associated with a home Census Block and a work Census Block. In
Residence Area Characteristics(RAC) Data Set, jobs are totaled by home Census Block,
while in Workplace Area Characteristics(WAC) Data Set, jobs are totaled by work Census
Block. It is worth noting that WAC Data Set also breaks down the job totals into multiple
subtotals by different ways of categorization. Specifically, WAC data include not only the
total numbers of jobs held by different age groups, different ethnicity groups or groups with
different educational achievements, but also the total numbers of jobs with different salary
ranges or in different sectors. The rich data on job totals allow us to construct a number of
different job access measures.
3. Empirical Strategy and Variable Definition
In terms of the empirical strategy, we apply the same linear model as Christensen and

















where i is the index of the auditor, k is the index of the house, f is the index of the trial, Jikf
represents the job access of the house k recommended to agent i in trial f, Rim(m=1,2,3) are
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race indicators for blacks (m=1), hispanics (m=2) and asians (m=3), αf represents the fixed
effect for trial f that absorb differences across trials, β0 is the constant term, εikf is an error
term, J̃ikf is the job access of the advertised unit assigned in trial f, Wikfd represents one of
other control variables indexed by d, including characteristics of house k, assigned and true
characteristics of tester i and characteristics of trial f.
After dropping observations with missing values for certain variables, house prices below
$10000 or no records of the assigned advertised house, we get a final sample of 13443 obser-
vations which come from 2867 trials. Each observation corresponds to a house recommended
to a tester in a trial. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the four race indicators and
all the control variables denoted by Wikfd.
Based on WAC data from LODES, the job access of a house is in general defined as the
job count in a certain category within a certain distance from that house. After geocoding
the address of all the recommended houses in the sample, the distance between a job in cen-
sus block j and a house is calculated as the distance between the centroid of census block j
and that given house. We have constructed six sets of job access measures of a recommended
house. Each set of job access measures include nine different job counts and corresponds to
one of the six panels in Table 2 respectively. In other words, 6×9=54 different dependent
variables have been constructed for 54 regressions in our study. And Table 2 presents not
only the variable definitions but also the summary statistics of those 54 dependent variables
of interest. As an example, the first set of job access measures, corresponding to Panel A
of Table 2, is defined as the job count within the median commuting distance in the MSA
at which the recommended house is located. As is suggested by variable definition in Panel
A of Table 2, the first job count variable in Panel A adds up numbers of all jobs within
the median commuting distance from the recommended house, while the remaining eight
job count variables in Panel A each add up numbers of a certain category of jobs only such
as jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less, jobs in the service sector, jobs held by
white workers, etc. Similarly, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th sets of job access measures correspond
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to Panel B, C, D, E, and each include nine job count variables that add up numbers of jobs
in a certain category within 1, 2, 3, 4 miles from the recommended house respectively. And
the definitions of the job categories are exactly the same as those in Panel A of Table 2.
The sixth set of job access measures, which corresponds to Panel F of Table 2, is de-
fined as
∑
j Zj · e−dj following Ottensmann et al.(2008), where Zj equals the job count in a
certain category in census block j if census block j is within the commuting distance from
the recommended house and equals zero otherwise. And dj is the distance(in miles) from a
given recommended house to the centroid of census block j. Essentially, the sixth set of job
access measures places smaller weight on jobs further away from the recommended house,
as opposed to the first set of job access measures, which simply places equal weights on all
jobs regardless of the distance between the job and the recommended house.
Among all nine job categories introduced in any panel of Table 2, the jobs held by mi-
nority is of particular interest. According to Hellerstein et al.(2008), it is not due to a lack
of jobs but due to a lack of jobs that hire minority people that makes it hard for minorities
to find a job. That means perhaps for minorities, the total number of jobs held by people
of the same race within a certain distance might be a better job access measure than the
total number of all jobs within a certain distance. Moreover, jobs with earnings of $1250 per
month or less should also be paid attention from the perspective of a policy maker. After
all, low-income minority workers are more likely to be denied access to jobs due to steering
than high-income ones.
Our reason to construct so many job access measures as dependent variables is obvious.
In the literature, it remains unclear what measure best describes job access. And we can
at least think of three major classes of job access measures, which are based on average
commuting distance, job counts, and job densities respectively. Even within one class of job
access measures, such as the one considered in our study, namely, a class of measures based
on job counts, we can still think of numerous job count variables, even more than those listed
in Table 2, among which we cannot decide on the best one. After all it is never our intention
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in this study to find the best job access measure. And we believe that all the regressions we
run are helpful and informative for our understanding of steering phenomenon.
We calculate the median commuting distance for each MSA based on OD data set. For
each job with a home census block and a work census block, we use the distance between
centroids of those two census blocks as the commuting distance for that job. After calcu-
lating and ordering the commuting distance for all the jobs in each MSA associated with
different home census blocks or work census blocks, we can find the median commuting dis-
tance for each MSA. Among 28 metropolitan sites selected in HDS2012, three sites are parts
of New York-Newark-Jersey City Metropolitan Statistical Area and two sites are parts of
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim Metropolitan Statistical Area. After combining sites in
the same MSA, we end up having 25 Metropolitan Areas. The median commuting distance
of each of the 25 Metropolitan Areas is presented in Table 3.
The job access of the corresponding advertised unit, denoted by J̃ikf , is an important
control variable on the right-hand-side of the regression, which is defined exactly the same
way as the dependent variable except that when we construct job access measures of the
advertised unit, we add up numbers of jobs within a certain distance from the advertised unit
instead of the recommended unit. Each variable in Table 4 serves as a control variable in
one of the 54 regressions we run and corresponds to one dependent variable in Table 2 with
the same order. In other words, the 54 regressions we run differ in the dependent variable
and one control variable only. All the remaining control variables in those regressions are the
same. The reason why we should control for J̃ikf is due to Ondrich et al.(2003) who find that
housing agents infer about preferences of homebuyers based on their initial request. Table 4
presents both the variable definitions and the summary statistics for J̃ikf . Among the total
2867 trials that generate 13443 observations in the sample, there are 175 trials with multiple
assigned advertised units for one tester in which case we average the job access measures of
all the advertised units for that tester.
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4. Estimation Results
As is mentioned in the previous section, we have altogether run 54 regressions, each of
which has a different job count variable as the dependent variable. Table 5 presents part of
the estimation results. As we can see, Table 5 consists of six panels, corresponding to six
sets of dependent variables in six panels of Table 2 respectively. In each panel of Table 5,
there are nine columns labeled as Column I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII and IX. Each of
the nine columns of Table 5 corresponds to different job categories in the same order of nine
rows in each panel of Table 2, which is also listed in Table 6. And each column in a panel







where ¯̃J represents the sample mean of J̃ikf , W̄d represents the sample mean of Wikfd, m
is again the index for the three minority races, corresponding to the three rows in each
panel of Table 5 labeled as Black, Hispanic and Asian respectively. Intuitively, expression
(2) gives us the average difference between the job counts within a certain distance from
a house recommended to a white tester and the job counts within a certain distance from
a house recommended to a minority tester corresponding to index m. For example, from
Panel A of Table 5, we can tell that compared to a house recommended to a white tester,
a house recommended to a black tester has on average 16277.4 more jobs nearby within the
median commuting distance, which is counterintuitive but insignificant. Actually, almost all
estimates in Table 5 are statistically insignificant, suggesting that steering might not have a
systematic impact on minority homebuyers’ access to jobs.
On the other hand, if we focus on homebuyers with gross annual household income lower
than 10000 dollars, which are most likely to be denied access to jobs due to spatial constraints,
we might find some evidence for steering. Table 7 reports the estimate and standard error
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which looks almost the same as (2) except that the sample mean ¯̃J and W̄d in (2) have been
replaced by the mean of the subsample where gross annual household income is below 10000
dollars, denoted by ¯̃J∗ and W̄ ∗d in (3). In other words, while Table 7 corresponds to the same
54 regressions to which Table 5 corresponds, the two tables report estimates and standard
errors on different linear combinations of coefficients from those 54 regressions. And appar-
ently different linear combination of coefficients have different economic interpretation.
Intuitively, expression (3) gives us the average difference between the job counts within
a certain distance from a house recommended to a white tester with gross annual house-
hold income lower than 10000 dollars and the job counts within a certain distance from a
house recommended to a minority counterpart. If we look at Panel A of Table 7, we can
see that estimates for blacks are positively significant in several columns and positive but
insignificant in other columns. In other words, within the median commuting distance, a
house recommended to a black auditor with household income lower than 10000 dollars on
average has significantly more jobs of certain categories nearby than a house recommended
to a white counterpart, which is not consistent with the steering mechanism behind SMH but
can be partially explained by Column VII of Table 7. Column VII of Table 7, in each panel,
corresponds to a regression with numbers of jobs held by white near a recommended house.
And the significantly positive estimate for Black in Column VII of Panel A means a house
recommended to a black auditor with household income lower than 10000 dollars on average
has significantly more jobs held by white workers nearby than a house recommended to a
white counterpart. According to Hellerstein et al.(2008), more jobs held by white workers
close to a house might not lead to a better labor market outcome for black workers due
to racial discrimination in the labor market, which thereby at least partially explain the
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seemingly contradiction between the data and SMH for low-income black workers. It might
be case that housing agents systematically steer black homebuyers to houses with a lot of
jobs nearby, but most of those nearby jobs are more likely to hire white and Hispanic people.
Then black workers, in fact, are still denied access to job opportunities, which might lead to
poor labor market outcomes.
We would also like to emphasize Panel B of Table 7, where we compare numbers of jobs
within 1 mile from the houses recommended to white auditors with household income lower
than 10000 dollars and the houses recommended to their minority counterparts. As we can
see in Panel B, the estimates for Hispanic are almost all significantly negative, which sup-
ports discriminatory steering. We believe the results in Panel B is of particular interest not
only because it focuses on low-income homebuyers but also due to the fact that 1 mile is
usually thought of as the walking distance. And numbers of jobs within the walking distance
are especially important to low-income minorities who either do not own a car or cannot
afford commuting in a car.
Based on our findings in both Table 5 and Table 7, we take the position that while
discriminatory steering does not have a significant impact on minorities overall, it might
still have some systematic impact on certain groups of minorities such as low-income His-
panics. Besides, although the possibility remains that housing agents systematically steer
low-income Hispanics to neighborhoods with poor job access, it is more likely that housing
agents are in fact not so sophisticated and do not have good sense of job access of those
neighborhoods. It is entirely possible that housing agents just tried to steer minorities to
crummy neighborhoods which happen to have poor job access. Although our study is not
able to distinguish between those two possibilities, the underlying mechanism behind SMH
holds in both cases, which guarantees the validity of our approach in this paper.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to test Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis, using
experimental data. While we do not find decisive evidence for discriminatory steering in the
housing market that denies minorities access to jobs, suggestive evidence shows that steering
might have some impact on low-income Hispanics. Our findings not only contributes to the
literature on steering, but also, to some extent, verifies the underlying mechanism of Spatial
Mismatch Hypothesis.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Tester and House Characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Race Dummies





Whether the tester is currently employed (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.581 0.493
Whether the tester is currently a student (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.149 0.356
Whether the tester has been a tester before (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.224 0.417
Household Estimated Gross Annual Income:










$150000 or more 0.019 0.136
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Tester and House Characteristics (Continue)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Tester True Characteristic (Continue)
Highest Level of Education Completed:
Grade school or less (omitted) 0.000 0.009
Some High School 0.003 0.054
Graduate Equivalency Degree 0.003 0.058
High School diploma 0.043 0.204
Some vocational/technical or business school 0.008 0.092
Vocational/technical/business certificate/diploma 0.038 0.191
Some college 0.152 0.359
Associates Degree 0.063 0.243
Bachelor’s Degree (BA; BS) 0.365 0.481
Some Graduate/ Professional School 0.042 0.201
Graduate/professional degree 0.282 0.45
Whether the tester rent or own a house:




Whether it is the advertised house (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.307 0.461
Number of bedrooms 3.315 0.947
House price ($) 318030.638 320372.027
Tester Assigned Characteristic
Years of employment at current job 4.359 2.025
Years at current residence 4.253 2.004
Whether the tester owns a car (1=Yes, 0=No) 0.96 0.196
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Tester and House Characteristics (Continue)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Tester Assigned Characteristic (Continue)
Reason for Moving:
Tired of renting; would like a place of my own (omitted) 0.192 0.394
Seems like a good time to buy 0.328 0.469
Been renting for a long time; Owning seems good 0.116 0.32
Would like the tax benefits of homeownership 0.126 0.332
Always wanted to own, but never took the time 0.058 0.234
Would like the freedom to decorate my own home 0.026 0.16
Buying our/my first home 0.095 0.293
Ready for the responsibility of homeownership 0.043 0.204
Have recently relocated to the area 0.015 0.123
Reason the Tester can Afford the Down Payment:
I’ve been saving for quite a while (omitted) 0.537 0.499
My/our parents are helping me/us 0.189 0.392
I inherited money from a relative 0.205 0.404
I/we had equity in a previously owned home 0.069 0.253
Household Composition:
Single adult (omitted) 0.119 0.323
Single female adult, one child 0.05 0.217
Married couple, no children 0.221 0.415
Married couple, one child 0.242 0.428
Married couple, two children of the same gender 0.09 0.286
Married couple, two children of different genders 0.205 0.404
Married couple, three children 0.074 0.262
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Tester and House Characteristics (Continue)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Tester Assigned Characteristic (Continue)
Tpye of Housing Requested:
Single-family (ommitted) 0.830 0.375
Condo 0.156 0.363
Mobile house 0.001 0.023
Co-op 0.013 0.113
Test Sequence: Whether a Tester Goes First or Second
The tester goes first (omitted) 0.523 0.499
The tester goes second 0.477 0.499
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Job Access Measure for the Recommended House
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Job count within median commuting distance from the recommended house
All jobs 507411.552 575605.544 199 3832917
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 109292.569 110454.613 86 723432
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 159024.4 160232.938 77 1024629
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 239094.583 312108.746 36 2094571
Jobs in the service sector 453175.806 538614.657 123 3609254
Jobs in the non-service sector 54235.746 47311.419 70 284244
Jobs held by white workers 370523.11 383740.327 190 2470791
Jobs held by black workers 80281.850 122313.936 1 818464
Jobs held by hispanic workers 98633.189 136232.714 35 783851
Panel B: Job count for jobs within 1 mile from the recommended house
All jobs 10890.013 50956.721 0 1047074
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 2266.896 8106.493 0 154889
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 3043.577 11382.218 0 218427
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 5579.541 31992.49 0 673758
Jobs in the service sector 10254.213 49413.509 0 1011996
Jobs in the non-service sector 635.801 1918.636 0 36809
Jobs held by white workers 7802.26 35135.4 0 717675
Jobs held by black workers 1779.345 8969.143 0 168192
Jobs held by hispanic workers 1835.858 8368.781 0 171942
Panel C: Job count for jobs within 2 miles from the recommended house
All jobs 38451.434 133067.389 0 1560556
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 7873.477 21389.549 0 256206
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 10884.439 30182.108 0 350671
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 19693.517 82118.834 0 965148
Jobs in the service sector 35784.064 128919.609 0 1506735
Jobs in the non-service sector 2667.369 5050.257 0 64280
Jobs held by white workers 27508.767 90698.133 0 1053302
Jobs held by black workers 6286.74 23907.968 0 281946
Jobs held by hispanic workers 6595.596 22900.065 0 264683
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Job Access Measure for the Recommended House (Con-
tinue)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel D: Job count for jobs within 3 miles from the recommended house
All jobs 74652.747 200976.073 9 2424215
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 15534.164 33496.333 2 367472
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 21814.554 47638.374 2 540510
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 37304.029 120944.323 0 1525504
Jobs in the service sector 68746.703 193444.582 0 2341182
Jobs in the non-service sector 5906.044 9074.578 0 95925
Jobs held by white workers 53549.821 135725.395 8 1585763
Jobs held by black workers 12220.726 37716.051 0 488619
Jobs held by hispanic workers 13046.948 36343.451 0 425722
Panel E: Job count for jobs within 4 miles from the recommended house
All jobs 117429.812 259387.983 21 2700463
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 24751.339 44626.342 5 432347
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 35146.017 64152.036 2 632491
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 57532.456 152289.022 1 1635625
Jobs in the service sector 107303.944 248252.247 5 2589046
Jobs in the non-service sector 10125.868 13438.436 0 112417
Jobs held by white workers 84419.78 173838.933 18 1762527
Jobs held by black workers 19240.661 50724.17 0 542998
Jobs held by hispanic workers 20890.798 49147.525 0 498562
Panel F: Weighted job total
All jobs 17292.248 52856.166 4.392 777502.063
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 3596.184 8718.464 1.062 124125.992
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 4996.183 12293.525 0.898 172470
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 8699.880 32106.793 0.251 480906.094
Jobs in the service sector 16016.514 51073.216 1.445 748023.938
Jobs in the non-service sector 1275.734 2097.158 0.265 29478.18
Jobs held by white workers 12397.576 35882.895 3.957 528110.5
Jobs held by black workers 2835.052 9724.585 0.01 130851.773
Jobs held by hispanic workers 3004.385 9300.598 0.111 133161.875
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Table 3: Median Commuting Distance of 25 Metropolitan Areas
Metropolitan Area Median Commuting Distance
Albuquerque, NM 7.194







Dallas Division, TX 13.100
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI 11.680
Fort Worth Division, TX 13.969
Piedmont Triad, NC 11.777
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 13.456
Kansas City, MO-KS 9.958
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA 10.138
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL 9.610
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA 8.060
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 9.043
Richmond, VA 11.577
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 19.854
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 10.884
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 10.911
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 8.834
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 9.459
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 11.558
Note: The commuting distance is measured in miles.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Job Access Measure for the Advertised House
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Job count for jobs within the median commuting distance from the advertised house
All jobs 504483.507 576561.378 810 3826675
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 108926.152 111384.045 177 723432
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 158017.584 160944.634 261 1023770
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 237539.771 311565.148 187 2087215
Jobs in the service sector 450580.782 539185.717 301 3604245
Jobs in the non-service sector 53902.725 47357.839 70 284244
Jobs held by white workers 368574.498 385064.466 744 2465476
Jobs held by black workers 79685.215 121899.696 12 816251
Jobs held by hispanic workers 98511.34 137707.289 35 781536
Panel B: Job count for jobs within 1 mile from the advertised house
All jobs 10948.127 48731.324 0 1047074
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 2250.456 7730.087 0 154889
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 3024.966 10870.563 0 218427
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 5672.705 30638.2 0 673758
Jobs in the service sector 10301.608 47280.566 0 1011996
Jobs in the non-service sector 646.519 1876.404 0 36809
Jobs held by white workers 7858.741 33717.785 0 717675
Jobs held by black workers 1785.163 8518.922 0 168192
Jobs held by hispanic workers 1829.345 7936.224 0 171942
Panel C: Job count for jobs within 2 miles from the advertised house
All jobs 39618.912 136767.759 0 1560556
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 7943.922 21759.582 0 255267
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 11005.324 30747.89 0 349582
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 20669.666 84901.722 0 965148
Jobs in the service sector 36958.145 132702.16 0 1506735
Jobs in the non-service sector 2660.767 4932.969 0 63785
Jobs held by white workers 28331.06 93575.903 0 1050323
Jobs held by black workers 6507.369 24426.966 0 278269
Jobs held by hispanic workers 6709.49 23339.812 0 264683
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of the Job Access Measure for the Advertised House (Continue)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel D: Job count for jobs within 3 miles from the advertised house
All jobs 75793.231 204108.299 9 2404211
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 15681.1 34201.934 2 367472
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 21999.633 48477.697 5 540510
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 38112.499 122503.497 2 1502045
Jobs in the service sector 69944.629 196585.65 0 2308286
Jobs in the non-service sector 5848.602 8950.617 0 95925
Jobs held by white workers 54377.943 138359.938 8 1570543
Jobs held by black workers 12464.123 38020.792 0 488619
Jobs held by hispanic workers 13086.73 36584.088 0 425722
Panel E: Job count for jobs within 4 miles from the advertised house
All jobs 117267.848 259786.58 32 2700463
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 24656.211 44849.226 9 432347
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 35004.596 64285.007 16 632491
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 57607.042 152324.606 7 1635625
Jobs in the service sector 107251.508 248716.4 5 2589046
Jobs in the non-service sector 10016.341 13265.216 9 112417
Jobs held by white workers 84359.808 174762.022 29 1762527
Jobs held by black workers 19274.677 50442.898 1 542998
Jobs held by hispanic workers 20714.821 48749.792 1 498562
Panel F: Weighted job total
All jobs 17537.485 52749.661 6.937 777502.063
Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less 3609.44 8678.696 1.062 124125.992
Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month 5013.729 12244.283 2.642 172470
Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more 8914.316 32099.99 3.233 480906.094
Jobs in the service sector 16268.927 51023.272 1.445 748023.938
Jobs in the non-service sector 1268.557 2038.534 0.265 29478.18
Jobs held by white workers 12584.31 35961.377 5.701 528110.5
Jobs held by black workers 2878.001 9653.165 0.075 130851.773
Jobs held by hispanic workers 3016.696 9218.654 0.202 133161.875
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Table 5: Overall Marginal Effect
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Panel A: Job count within median commuting distance from the recommended house
Black 16277.4 2504.7 3961.4 9773.4 15171.1 1174.4 10565.4 2507.1 1787.7
(9663.1) (1763.5) (2671.6) (5483.6) (8502.2) (1461.4) (6619.5) (1843.7) (1899.6)
Hispanic -2156.0 -721.5 95.8 -1449.0 -2773.3 800.3 -1844.6 -33.8 -1440.4
(12234.0) (2346.2) (3385.5) (6703.3) (10964.3) (1460.6) (8197.6) (2467.6) (2162.2)
Asian -12610.8 -3546.1 -3957.1 -5115.3 -12550.6 -94.8 -7342.7 -3353.0 -3338.6
(11620.9) (2252.0) (3272.1) (6262.4) (10830.7) (995.8) (7733.2) (2318.3) (2613.3)
Panel B: Job count for jobs within 1 mile from the recommended house
Black 1438.9 82.2 185.9 1196.3 1432.9 2.5 982.2 227.7 209.4
(1395.7) (243.6) (331.4) (825.0) (1318.6) (75.4) (987.8) (217.3) (213.5)
Hispanic 2875.5 242.5 571.3 2068.4 2672.8 121.0* 2056.9 531.2 478.6
(1807.0) (236.5) (415.0) (1184.2) (1738.6) (52.7) (1279.3) (348.5) (252.1)
Asian -511.1 -149.4 -263.6 -92.5 -543.9 10.7 -268.6 -262.1 48.5
(834.9) (143.2) (212.4) (503.0) (840.9) (42.9) (563.6) (211.6) (112.5)
Panel C: Job count for jobs within 2 miles from the recommended house
Black 3376.5 499.4 697.8 2174.5 3275.7 101.1 2522.3 417.0 398.9
(3647.1) (609.7) (857.3) (2200.0) (3446.0) (230.9) (2461.3) (640.2) (592.2)
Hispanic 6558.2 717.7 1382.9 4457.6* 6121.9 260.0 4629.2 1157.6 977.6
(3353.0) (525.6) (861.6) (1982.3) (3148.5) (199.1) (2318.6) (607.7) (516.4)
Asian -4559.1 -803.3 -1248.8 -2482.3 -4514.7 -75.0 -2758.3 -1629.6 -10.0
(3569.5) (596.7) (943.1) (2090.2) (3506.9) (140.9) (2357.3) (974.6) (373.2)
Panel D: Job count for jobs within 3 miles from the recommended house
Black -385.9 318.8 -30.1 -694.9 -289.0 -54.6 16.1 -542.8 -202.0
(5155.9) (712.2) (1114.0) (3466.4) (4930.5) (360.8) (3482.0) (1067.1) (819.4)
Hispanic 5446.8 483.2 1391.3 3570.7 4971.8 266.1 3690.7 1241.7 902.5
(4284.9) (721.8) (1148.1) (2516.9) (3910.6) (353.0) (2953.2) (807.5) (701.9)
Asian -10144.8 -1566.9 -2033.6 -6524.8 -10324.8 93.2 -6361.3 -3202.4* -247.9
(5647.5) (951.2) (1398.0) (3493.9) (5560.7) (247.6) (3813.1) (1444.2) (665.3)
Panel E: Job count for jobs within 4 miles from the recommended house
Black 2772.4 789.5 376.6 1585.9 2977.9 -216.4 2097.1 -32.0 185.4
(4924.2) (766.4) (1148.2) (3240.9) (4701.0) (443.2) (3288.3) (1061.9) (958.4)
Hispanic 6678.9 655.0 1759.6 4259.1 6133.1 437.1 4707.8 1617.8 1095.0
(6154.5) (1067.0) (1720.3) (3421.7) (5814.2) (420.2) (4316.6) (1265.9) (993.7)
Asian -2805.1 -849.2 -437.7 -1514.8 -3207.6 352.2 -914.4 -2021.8 634.2
(6711.6) (1282.4) (1858.9) (3716.4) (6577.5) (327.0) (4684.1) (1746.0) (956.1)
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Table 5: Overall Marginal Effect (Continue)
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Panel F: Weighted Job Total
Black 1081.1 153.1 186.1 740.9 1062.2 8.0 790.7 103.1 141.6
(1346.7) (231.9) (312.9) (812.0) (1279.0) (82.3) (916.3) (241.8) (219.2)
Hispanic 2520.6 246.1 551.8 1722.4 2343.1 120.6 1779.3 490.5 401.4
(1488.7) (220.1) (369.8) (907.6) (1413.9) (79.3) (1034.8) (287.5) (224.4)
Asian -1488.2 -287.7 -403.1 -781.3 -1507.9 14.9 -878.2 -551.8 1.8
(1216.5) (211.4) (320.5) (708.6) (1199.1) (51.3) (812.1) (329.1) (142.3)
∗∗∗ represents statistical significance at 1h level.
∗∗ represents statistical significance at 1% level.
∗ represents statistical significance at 5% level.
114
Table 6: Column Definition for Table 5
Column Number Job Category
I All jobs
II Jobs with earnings of $1250 per month or less
III Jobs with earnings from $1251 to $3333 per month
IV Jobs with earnings of $3333 per month and more
V Jobs in the service sector
VI Jobs in the non-service sector
VII Jobs held by white workers
VIII Jobs held by black workers
IX Jobs held by hispanic workers
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Table 7: Marginal Effect for Minorities with Gross Annual Income Lower than $10000
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Panel A: Job count within median commuting distance from the recommended house
Black 54684.3* 8372.2 12983.1 33205.6* 51449.1* 3139.1 34654.4* 9902.9 8659.6
(24779.5) (4675.9) (7550.6) (12997.1) (22370.9) (2914.7) (16782.6) (5204.7) (5712.5)
Hispanic -20909.9 -4883.5 -3888.4 -12030.6 -21809.1 1118.2 -13822.3 -4274.7 -4434.2
(35133.2) (6000.9) (10036.8) (19429.9) (31749.1) (3668.5) (25016.5) (6243.1) (5892.3)
Asian -12648.4 -4542.9 -4622.0 -3921.4 -11001.5 -1656.8 -4251.6 -6669.9 -2794.8
(37915.7) (6382.7) (9611.1) (22007.0) (35613.6) (2650.1) (23809.4) (8976.6) (5983.3)
Panel B: Job count for jobs within 1 mile from the recommended house
Black -8565.9 -1214.6 -1416.6 -5786.3 -8379.7 -237.0 -6052.6 -1439.5 -1635.7
(8429.1) (1130.1) (1747.3) (5575.7) (8203.0) (261.8) (5770.5) (1511.3) (1340.3)
Hispanic -9602.2** -1612.2** -2298.2** -5625.2* -9848.9** 123.3 -6923.4** -1677.8** -1166.9*
(3263.2) (466.3) (739.9) (2110.9) (3000.9) (195.4) (2267.1) (532.9) (514.4)
Asian -976.1 -215.9 -299.1 -373.8 -1037.2 24.4 -713.3 -137.4 -219.4
(1859.3) (274.5) (426.2) (1197.1) (1847.2) (87.3) (1270.9) (372.2) (258.4)
Panel C: Job count for jobs within 2 miles from the recommended house
Black -7043.6 -573.8 -926.3 -5495.7 -7054.7 18.8 -4484.1 -1060.6 -1726.2
(15941.5) (2384.0) (3538.5) (10044.5) (15421.3) (639.7) (10778.3) (2959.8) (2293.9)
Hispanic -11734.9 -2456.9** -3353.9* -5919.7 -12382.9* 323.1 -8735.3* -2158.1* -1725.3
(5734.8) (851.5) (1425.5) (3733.6) (5135.2) (731.9) (4077.5) (879.4) (1098.8)
Asian -3909.1 -558.9 -872.9 -2488.1 -3944.9 10.3 -2754.9 -578.5 -541.6
(4953.4) (699.0) (1173.3) (3172.8) (4968.5) (233.1) (3355.9) (1126.2) (609.1)
Panel D: Job count for jobs within 3 miles from the recommended house
Black -6540.7 -160.4 -1480.6 -5046.6 -6293.8 -199.0 -4417.9 -483.5 -2186.3
(14925.5) (2349.4) (3384.6) (9728.6) (14392.9) (767.8) (10064.8) (2995.9) (2263.8)
Hispanic -18170.1 -4038.1 -4447.1 -9626.2 -18855.8 260.8 -13991.6 -2017.6 -2274.5
(11869.1) (2093.1) (3008.2) (7053.7) (10916.7) (1329.6) (8809.6) (1623.2) (2044.9)
Asian -10627.2 -1946.3 -2188.7 -6437.9 -10982.9 361.0 -7667.9 -1831.4 -423.0
(9923.5) (1464.6) (2201.2) (6426.5) (9800.5) (545.6) (6945.8) (2021.2) (1043.3)
Panel E: Job count for jobs within 4 miles from the recommended house
Black -3190.8 894.4 -1043.9 -3153.7 -2859.8 -316.5 -1774.9 -371.7 -2198.1
(13726.7) (2482.7) (3303.8) (8689.8) (13244.5) (929.0) (9126.4) (2927.7) (2247.3)
Hispanic -23528.0 -4827.0 -6119.4 -12542.9 -23459.8 -366.2 -17580.4 -2702.6 -3860.5
(15230.0) (2787.0) (4158.5) (8566.0) (13834.8) (1669.7) (11504.6) (1878.0) (2812.9)
Asian -1321.8 -996.8 -227.8 -78.5 -1942.4 633.9 -699.3 -442.1 1470.4
(10402.4) (1740.5) (2550.8) (6399.6) (9990.5) (733.3) (7313.5) (2026.5) (1040.3)
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Table 7: Marginal Effect for Minorities with Gross Annual Income Lower than $10000(Con-
tinue)
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Panel F: Weighted Job Total
Black -4732.5 -445.1 -754.7 -3459.8 -4682.6 -59.4 -3282.0 -713.6 -1051.5
(6377.4) (915.5) (1349.5) (4111.8) (6192.7) (204.0) (4354.0) (1163.8) (933.9)
Hispanic -6449.7* -1225.8** -1644.2* -3571.4* -6659.9** 117.0 -4756.7** -1043.4** -849.2
(2370.4) (365.0) (603.4) (1466.5) (2122.7) (281.3) (1682.5) (350.3) (449.3)
Asian -1690.2 -292.6 -365.2 -1032.9 -1751.8 62.0 -1190.7 -265.9 -143.0
(1815.2) (263.9) (428.6) (1156.1) (1816.2) (72.7) (1234.0) (397.4) (229.5)
∗∗∗ represents statistical significance at 1h level.
∗∗ represents statistical significance at 1% level.
∗ represents statistical significance at 5% level.
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